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ABSTRACT
Psychosis and Schizophrenia have been associated with severe disruptions in self-
narrative, which may be driven by a medical model which denies meaning to psychotic-
like-experience (PLE), and negatively positions 'patients'. Alternative understandings of 
PLE exist cross/sub-culturally, and have been associated with good outcomes. 
Furthermore, a marginalised but significant body of theory proposes that PLE may 
represent an adaptive problem-solving or paradigm-shifting mechanism, reconfiguring 
redundant conceptualisations of 'reality'.
Drawing on Positioning theory, and the critical work of Michel Foucault, to inform a 
Critical Narrative Analysis, this thesis interrogates the potentially transformative impact of 
understanding out-of-the-ordinary experiences, such as seeing visions, or hearing voices, 
from a 'spiritual' or 'mystical' rather than 'medical' perspective. Taking a multiple case-
study approach, three publicly available self-narratives of 'spiritually' transformative 
'Psychosis' are explored. The nature of the 'self' produced, narratives drawn upon and 
implications for the medical model are considered.
All three accounts draw on an idiosyncratic 'bricolage' of narrative resources to integrate 
their PLE into richly developed self-narratives. PLE is understood as profoundly 
meaningful, external to the self and universally accessible. The experience drives a 
reconstruction of 'reality' which repositions the narrator, and allows them to transcend 
unwanted aspects of their 'prior-selves'. A dichotomy is introduced between enlightened 
and unenlightened minds, which necessitates restricted communication, and tactical 
silencing.
From a Foucauldian perspective (2006a) the accounts are seen to function in a fashion 
comparable to the 'mystical/spiritual' 'counter-conduct'; troubling the dimorphism between
'patient' and 'professional'; reversing the medical 'gaze'; and drawing on the counter-
readings of 'spiritual' sub-communities to reverse the hierarchy of 'truth' and determine 
their own 'reality'.
Implications for further research, and professional practice, are discussed in light of the 
analysis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Current Study
This thesis explores the impact of understanding out-of-the-ordinary experiences,
such as seeing visions, or hearing voices, from a 'spiritual' or 'mystical', rather 
than 'medical', perspective (see Glossary 7.1). Within the mental health (MH) 
medical narrative, such 'psychosis-like-experiences' (PLEs) are generally 
pathologised; I am interested in how this pathologisation is resisted by those who 
come to understand their experiences as 'spiritually' significant. Both my 
introduction and analysis employ a narrative lens; the analysis is supplemented 
by Foucauldian theory (see Method, 2.3.2.2.), which enables consideration of the 
conditions of possibility of such tellings, and the operations of knowledge-power.
1.2. Researcher's Position
I will first consider how aspects of my own experience may have shaped this 
thesis:
While I do not hold any firm religious or spiritual conviction, I have a long standing
interest in Buddhist philosophy, and an (irregular) meditative practice. Perhaps as
a result, I identify with the notion of peak experiences, and the meaningfulness of 
different 'levels' of 'reality'. The closest I have come to PLE is occasionally 
hearing voices in the space between sleeping and waking. I am a member of the 
Spiritual Crisis Network, and have discussed spiritual aspects of PLE at their 
London meeting many times. In addition, I am openly critical of the medical model
of 'mental illness'; a position I developed working alongside critical psychologists, 
which has become more firmly established through my training at UEL, my 
clinical work (particularly with those who describe PLE), and my reading of critical
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scholars such as Michel Foucault and Michael White. I intend to take an agnostic 
stance on such issues, and to treat all notions of 'truth' and 'reality' critically.
Foucault would challenge us to look at what the particular 'truth' I offer below is 
doing, and how it relates to power. In this light, this thesis could be understood as
an attempt to position psychology in general, and myself in particular, favourably 
in relation to traditional psychiatry. It is important then, that I aim to be transparent
in my analysis, but also in the way in which I address the literature (for literature 
review strategy, see Appendix 7.1).
1.3. Narrative
The Narrative turn in academic psychology is well documented (e.g., Squire, 
Andrews & Tamboukou, 2008). Here, I introduce some key concepts briefly, and 
only insofar as they are directly relevant to justifying my focus on narrative.
Approximately three decades ago, “psychologists became alive to the possibility 
of narrative as a form not only of representing but of constituting reality” (Bruner, 
1991:5). Sarbin (1986) suggested that narrative could, and should, be understood
as the organizing principle for all human action. Our narrative structures are 
central to the way we understand the world; it is through narrative that we 
interpret our experiences and interactions and, thus, constitute 'reality'.
Narratives are simultaneously general and idiosyncratic; being both individually 
produced, and constrained by shared understandings (Somers, 1994).  
Depending on our cultural context, particular 'shared understandings' are more 
credible and influential; I will refer to these as 'dominant narratives'. Dominant 
narratives are important because events that fit the dominant plot tend to be more
closely attended to, and seen as more credible, thus shaping our experience of 
'reality' (Ridgway, 2001).
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1.4. Narrative Construction of Self
The 'post-modern turn' de-centred the human subject (Seidman, 1994). One of 
the key contributions of the so called post-humanist, or post-structuralist, writers 
(to include Derrida, Foucault and Nietzsche) was in troubling the concept of a 
unitary and coherent self; and in demonstrating how this 'fiction' emanates from 
the humanist discourse itself. Individuals could no longer be understood as 
having identity independent of their position in the social order. The self came to 
be understood as multiple, and continually, discursively produced within specific 
socio-cultural contexts.
Narrative provides a means by which our notion of identity can be structured, 
allowing us to make sense of long sequences of events, and facilitating the 
management of extreme complexity. Narrative identities are never complete, nor 
are they ever entirely our own; they are always in the process of being formed, 
unfolding in a flow of temporally and spatially specific social relationships 
(Somers,1994). Self-narratives are shaped by the social world in two important 
ways: through interaction, which occurs between speaker and audience – what 
Bakhtin (1986) called 'polyphonia'; and through the cultural repertoire of stories 
available to the speaker – Bakhtin's 'heteroglossia'. Heteroglossia implies that 
every story is assembled from multiple codes and genres, i.e., our narratives are 
cultural patchworks. Hence, for MacIntyre (1984:213), “we are never more (and 
sometimes less) that the co-authors of our own narratives. Only in fantasy do we 
live what story we please.”
Bruner (1991) suggests that by examining our stories, particularly those we tell 
about ourselves, we may achieve insights into the specific cultural 'rules' that 
govern how we interact with others, and who we can be, i.e., how narratives 
shape identity (e.g., Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). I am influenced by studies  
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which examine the situational production of identities through narrative co-
construction (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Bamberg, De Fina & Schiffrin, 2010; 
Bamberg & Georgakopoulou, 2008). Bamberg et al. (2011:178) describe identity 
“as constructed in discourse, as negotiated among speaking subjects in social 
contexts”. 
In addition, Andrews (2004) suggests that, although narrative is influential in 
shaping our interactions with others, its true power derives from internalisation, 
when it is taken within the self as 'real'. Together, the narratives available for 
internalisation, and those deployed by others about us (which well may be the 
same), come to determine the kind of 'self' we construct (Burr, 2003). I adopt this 
outlook in examining how identities are performed, co-constructed, and 
constrained by context.
 
1.5. The Medical Model and Self-Narratives in 'Psychosis'
The 'medical model' is the dominant narrative of ‘mental distress’ in what we call 
'the West' (Kerr, Dent-Brown & Parry, 2007). The 'medical model' positions those 
experiencing PLE as suffering from a range of chronic brain diseases (e.g., 
'Schizophrenia' or 'Bipolar Disorder'), best responded to by medical intervention 
but, nevertheless, of poor prognosis. Within this 'reality', 'recovery' is traditionally 
construed “in terms of symptom reduction and long-term maintenance of 
'normality', understood only as an absence of symptoms” (Adame & Knudson, 
2007:160). What implications does this have for the self-narrative of the 'patient'? 
One practical implication may be that those exhibiting PLE are forcibly treated, 
including detentions and forced injections, in accordance with the law (Mental 
Health Act, 2007). Medical intervention for 'psychosis' may well be experienced 
as traumatising, or for many, re-traumatising (Read, van Os, Morrison & Ross, 
2005); and involves shame, humiliation and entrapment, as the 'psychosis 
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patient' is relegated to one of the least favourable categories in society 
(Birchwood, Fowler & Jackson, 2001). 
Furthermore, within the medical narrative the content of PLE is meaningless; 
alienating the experiencer and denying them opportunities to integrate these 
episodes into self-narrative. Johnstone (2000:81) has argued that “personal 
meaning is the first biggest casualty” of 'Schizophrenia'. This deficit of personal 
meaning may contribute to what has been described as “a profound disturbance 
to a person's sense of self” in 'psychosis' (Karatza & Avdi, 2011:215). For 
instance, Raffard et al. (2010) compared the narratives of a group of 'patients 
with Schizophrenia' to 'healthy controls'. They demonstrated that 'patient' 
narratives were less coherent and elaborate; and this increased the longer the 
'patient' identity was inhabited. The authors attributed this deficit to the disease 
process, but such findings are also in line with a narrative interpretation which 
highlights the absence of meaningful narratives available to the 'patient'. 
The medical narrative has negative consequences beyond stripping meaning. 
The diagnosed also become recipients of the negative effects of a 'taboo identity' 
(May, 2012). A diagnosis of 'Schizophrenia' is particularly problematic (Knight, 
Wykes & Hayward, 2006; Schulze & Angermeyer, 2003); as a 'Schizophrenic' is 
perceived as being more likely to be violent (Angermeyer & Schulze, 2001). This 
dominant narrative is supported by media reports which often draw a connection 
between diagnosis and the risk of violence (Harper, 2002). This understanding is 
so influential that such negative images have been shown to be internalised by 
the 'Schizophrenic patient' (Rogers et al., 1998). Furthermore, the 'illness' 
metaphor renders futures uncertain, thereby compromising 'recovery'; as, even in
the absence of ongoing PLE, 'patients' are concerned that 'ill-health' might return,
which compounds feelings of shame and hopelessness (McCann & Clark, 2004).
The medical model metaphor also has implications for embodiment: if a body is 
“broken” by disease, then “to be fixable the body has to be some kind of 
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machine” (Frank, 1995:88). Applied to emotional distress, “the mind is cast as 
computer, with 'mental illness' as a virus that infects functions and disrupts 
outputs” (Adame & Hornstein, 2006:136). Within the physical illness narrative the 
distinction between the broken body and the individual is preserved, e.g., “People
say 'I have cancer', they don't say 'I am cancer' (Manning, 1994:169). For 'mental 
illness', the distinction between body and individual breaks down, which “reduces 
a multi-faceted human being to a diagnosis” (ibid:170).
How does this process unfold in a system designed to support people? White 
(1995:14) suggests that “ways of speaking and acting make it possible for MH 
professionals to construct people as the objects of psychiatric knowledge, to 
contribute to a sense of identity which has 'otherness' as its central feature”. 
Psychiatric knowledge also allows the clinician to speak 'truth' about their 
'patients'. Being positioned as a 'patient', means defining one's experiences in 
accordance with the psychiatric model, “thereby influencing both the types of 
subjectivity and identity that are brought into being” (Parker et al., 1995:73). 
Thus, psychiatric 'truth' constructs 'reality' for those experiencing PLE in a 
medical context (House, 2003). The medical model is a 'terministic screen' 
(Burke, 1966), a narrative which creates a world, but denies alternative realities; 
blinkering both the recipients and benefactors of care. 
Recently, it has been suggested that a '“crucial [and] unique” (Roe & Lysaker, 
2012:10) aspect of 'recovery' from 'psychosis' is the development of a “coherent 
and consensually valid personal narrative” (e.g., France & Uhlin, 2006; Smorti et 
al., 2008; Saavedra, Cubero & Crawford, 2009). Lysaker et al. (2010:271) 
suggest that such a recovery “may involve the recapturing or developing [of] 
one's personal narrative”; and demonstrated that 'patients' with more “developed”
narratives had greater “wellness in daily life”, independent of “positive and 
negative symptoms, self report of hope and self-esteem and a test of general 
intellectual function” (ibid.). Lysaker and colleagues focussed upon the dialogical 
level, and suggested that those diagnosed with 'psychosis' are suffering a 
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biological narrative-making deficit. However, they did not attend to how cultural 
discourses (meta-narratives) may position the 'psychosis' self, and deprive the 
'patient' of narrative-making resources.
I have argued that the search for narrative in 'psychosis' is frustrated by a 
subjugating story which denies meaning. Nevertheless, narratives of 'recovery' 
have become increasingly common; in the 'grey' and academic literature, as well 
as online and in popular press (Adame & Hornstein, 2006). These accounts are 
heterogenous, but tend to reinstate 'meaningfulness'; a reversal which returns 
'symptoms' to 'experiences'. They suggest that the “rhetoric of scientific sadness” 
(Duffy & Dorner, 2011:201) of the medical model is radically overstated, and that 
very positive lives can follow PLE. In so doing, they represent a 'counter-
narrative', in resistance to dominant cultural narratives (Bamberg, 2004); often 
this resistance is achieved not in isolation, but through alliance with 'out groups'. 
The stories held by these groups produce a “counter reality” (Delgado, 1995:64) 
and represent a potential narrative reservoir, which might facilitate meaning-
making for those with similar pre-narrative experience, and offer a way to reclaim 
a preferred subject position. 
I am not suggesting that distress can be sidestepped by the selection of a new 
narrative. In many contexts the subjugating story may be so powerful as to 
effectively inhibit alternative meaning-making. Many factors push back against a 
self-selected narrative (e.g., the response of others, or material limitations). 
Nevertheless, counter-narratives do problematise the medical model, and in 
doing so raise the question of what enables the construction of more hopeful 
accounts, and whether the nature of available meta-narratives might influence 
this process (Thornhill et al., 2004).
The 'counter-narrative' I aim to address in this thesis frames PLE as 'spiritual' or 
'mystical'. In McCann and Clark's (2004) study 'spirituality' emerged as an 
important counter-balance to the negative identity implications of 'Schizophrenia': 
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“Having spiritual beliefs helped give meaning to the illness, provided a sense of 
inner warmth, and relieved the burden of being mentally ill” (p.790), whilst 
spiritual communities, identified as more accepting of these individuals, provided 
opportunities to develop supportive relationships.  
How 'spiritual' or 'religious' understandings act upon the experience is not well 
understood. A recent systematic review (Bonelli & Koenig, 2010) examined the 
relationship between religion/spirituality and MH. Of the 43 studies identified, 
72.1% found that increased religiosity/spirituality predicted less 'mental disorder'. 
Only five studies specifically addressed 'psychotic disorders', of which four 
suggested that increased religiosity/spirituality was associated with improved 
wellbeing. These findings suggest spiritual understandings may be associated 
with better outcomes, but fail to illuminate the nature of this relationship.
1.6. Evidence Based Medicine?
Given the medical model's appeal to scientific authority, we might expect it to be 
empirically well-supported. However, despite huge investment, evidence of a 
biological basis to 'Schizophrenia' is lacking (Bentall, 2004, 2009). Research into 
abnormalities in brain structure have produced inconsistent results, with most 
'patients' appearing normal (Lewine, 1998). Research into genetic linkages have 
suffered similar inconsistencies, and failed to identify specific loci, such that 
“there is no replicable support for any of the candidate genes” (Crow, 2007:13). 
Meanwhile large meta-analyses identify consistent environmental influences, 
particularly an apparently causal link with childhood abuse, which further troubles
medical accounts (Read et al., 2005). 
A central tenet of the medical model is that discrete 'mental illnesses' exist 
(Bentall, 2004), for 'psychosis' this seems not to be the case. The BPS (2000) 
suggest that, rather than consider the various psychiatric disorders as discrete 
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phenomena, we should imagine them as sitting along a continuum of 'madness'. 
In fact they argue that “mental health and 'mental illness' […] shade into each 
other and are not separate categories” (ibid:18). A recent systematic review by 
van Os et al. (2009) supports the notion of a 'psychosis continuum'. Their meta-
analysis found a prevalence of 5.3% for psychotic symptoms across the general 
population; up to 90% of these experiences “are transitory and disappear over 
time” (p.179). The authors suggest their findings support a “proneness-
persistence impairment model” of 'psychosis', such that “psychotic disorder may 
be conceptualised as the rare poor outcome of a common developmental 
phenotype” (ibid.). They explain persistence of 'psychosis' in 'poor outcome' 
cases as best accounted for by environmental risk factors such as 'social 
adversities'. This is important research as, in addition to validating the 'psychosis 
continuum' construct, their analysis suggested that 'normal self-resolving 
psychosis' is vastly more prevalent than so called 'psychotic disorder'. 
The authors’ 'sub-clinical psychosis' construct implies that PLE is, at best, only 
mildly problematic; a position troubled by large-scale population studies, which 
demonstrate the high-incidence of apparently benign PLE. For instance, 
approximately 10-15% of people report having had 'hallucinatory experiences' 
(Tien, 1991), whilst 17.5% of a Dutch sample (n=7076) rated positive for at least 
one of the seventeen 'Composite International Diagnostic Interview' psychosis 
items (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000). Even higher incidence rates have 
been identified amongst individuals who believe in the paranormal (Thalbourne, 
1994),  have profound religious experiences (Jackson, 1997), or are members of 
'new religious movements' (Day & Peters, 1999). Romme and Escher (1989) 
demonstrated that many individuals 'hear voices' outside of a psychiatric context, 
and construe this as a positive life experience. More recently, Karlson (2008) 
studied 'voice-hearing' in a non-clinical sample, and demonstrated that most 
participants considered their voices meaningful, and “more real than reality” 
(p.370).
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Evidence suggests that medical interventions for 'schizophrenia' and 'psychosis' 
are harmful (Breggin, 2008; Galynker & Nazarian, 1997), and associated with 
poor long-term outcomes (e.g., Bola & Mosher, 2003; Harrow & Jobe, 2007; 
Harding, Zubin & Strauss, 1987). Within the medical narrative, such 'treatments' 
are justified by the severity of the 'disease state' they seek to address, and by the
assumption that people would never 'recover' naturally. In light of this, comparing 
outcome data for medical and alternative approaches is revealing. A major series
of longitudinal studies by the World Health Organisation (Hopper et al., 2007) 
examined global outcomes for 'Schizophrenia'. Data collection went well beyond 
clinic settings in the 'developing' countries, where traditional and religious healers
(including Ayurvedic practitioners in India, and babalawo healers in Nigeria) were 
recruited to identify participants. This provided an opportunity to compare 
outcomes between medical and traditional explanatory models. Approximately 
two thirds (63%) of those identified in the 'developing' world experienced a benign
'psychosis', leading to full remission, as opposed to one third (37%) in the 
'developed' nations. Better outcomes in the 'developing' world were not the result 
of more intensive treatment as 55% were never hospitalized, (compared to 8% in 
the 'developed' nations); and only 16% of the former were taking antipsychotic 
medication (compared to 61%). Follow up studies demonstrated that these 
positive outcomes had been maintained, and individuals in 'developing' nations 
were still consistently better off (Hopper & Wanderling, 2000).
Thus 'recovery' appears to be inversely correlated with involvement in the 
psychiatric paradigm. This may be related to the reduced use of antipsychotics in 
'developing' nations, or the validating collective responses of the non-medical 
communities (Williams, 2012). For instance, collective responses address social 
isolation, which has been shown to be amongst the strongest predictors of poor 
outcome (Warner, 2005).
Finally the deficit-oriented medical model has no clear way to account for the 
apparent healing and growth sometimes seen following 'recovery'. For instance, 
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Tooth et al. (2003) in a study of 57 individuals identifying as being 'in recovery' 
from schizophrenia, found that 66% described their functioning as better, and 
44% as much better, than prior to the onset of the 'illness'. We need to look to 
alternative narratives to understand these findings.
1.7. Alternative Narratives
1.7.1. Historical narratives
Narratives of PLE in 'Western' culture have always been contested, caught up in 
the operations of power, and debates around the authority of 'inner experience'. 
PLE could be empowering or highly stigmatising, dependent on the individual's 
relationship with the available narratives and power structures of their period. 
Detailed examinations of the variety of historical understandings of PLE are 
available. For example, Leudar & Thomas (2000) take a multiple case study 
approach, spanning 2,800 years of human history, to examine how the 
experience of 'hearing voices' has become transformed, from being associated 
with divine intervention, to becoming a symptom of insanity. Further historical 
work explores the development of the conditions that shape experience in various
contexts. Leigh Schmidt's (2002) work offers a more localised account, examining
the impact of the contestation between American Christianity and Enlightenment 
discourses and its impact on the hearing voices experience in America. 
Meanwhile, Tony James (1995) explores the problematic relationship between 
dreams and madness as they were understood by notable French philosophers, 
doctors and writers of the 19th century. Each of these works demonstrates the 
essentially contested nature of 'truth' within this arena of human experience, and 
speaks to the complexity of the conditions of possibility of PLE. Whilst a full 
account is not presented here; I will now offer some historical arguments to make 
the claim that PLE has previously been “culturally integrated and semantically 
pregnant” (Berrios, 2002:35) – although, such meanings were not uniformly 
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positive – and that one implication of the medical model is the marginalisation of 
these cultural understandings.
There is extensive description of PLE in the classical period. Some have gone so 
far as to argue that experiences like 'hearing voices' were universal in humans 
until around 1000BC (Jaynes, 1986), although this claim has been cogently 
disputed (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). Nonetheless, PLE is widely described in 
historical documents. Dodds (1951) suggests that the most common 
'hallucinations' in Ancient Greece were visions of gods, or hearing divine voices 
commanding or prohibiting the performance of certain acts. Although the context 
for PLE at this time was one in which the 'reality' of ghosts, daemons, and deities 
was generally accepted, there is evidence that the meaning of such experience 
was already contested by a newly emerging medical framework (McCarthy-
Jones, 2012). So, whilst Socrates, who was guided by a 'daemon', accepted this, 
and considered madness and sanity to have equal value; Aristotle made attempts
to explain such 'Phantasms' as the result of faulty perceptual processing; and 
both Hippocrates (460-370 BC) and Galen (AD 129-199) sought to explain PLE in
relation to the humoural medical theory (ibid.).
Socrates’ 'daemon' told him what not to do. Leudar & Thomas (2000) suggest 
that this experience was phenomenologically comparable to contemporary 'voice 
hearing', being private, auditory in content, influential on action without being 
compulsive, and not under direct control of the experiencer. Such phenomena 
were not common in Ancient Athens, leading Plato and his contemporaries 
concluded that it was a sign from the divine, and evidence of his wisdom (ibid.). 
Socrates acted on the advice of his daemon, but not without consideration. He 
was able to make use of his daemon to publicly justify his actions and provide 
advice, and was not, in his time, seen as mad on account of this experience 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, the daemon was problematised at his trial, supporting the 
notion that our understandings of these kinds of inner experience have always 
been both important and contested. The challenge for Socrates was that, 
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although he lived in a society in which direct communication with gods and other 
'spiritual' figures was believed possible, such relationships (conferring power and 
status) were reserved for priests and spiritual authority figures; lacking such 
status, the validity of Socrates experience was eventually denied (Long, 2009).
Two millennia after his death Socrates experience continues to be contested. 
Beginning in the nineteenth-century France, Psychiatrists (then a newly emergent
professional group), seeking to establish the timeless validity of their constructs in
explaining the human condition, retrospectively diagnosed Socrates (alongside 
numerous other historical figures with similarly unusual subjective experiences) 
as victim of 'hallucinations' or worse (James, 1995). The value of such labels to 
Socrates is doubtful; Leudar & Thomas (2000) argue that whilst aspects of 
Socrates experiences do seem to fit with the modern concept of 'hallucination' 
this concept would not have been useful to him, as, in taking it up, he would 
necessarily have to give up much of his own worldview, and way of being that 
made him who he was. Socrates experience demonstrates the importance of 
historical and cultural context in the expression and reception of PLE, because 
his experience, whilst potentially categorisable as 'mad', was clearly not 
considered so during his period.
It is important to note that it is not only medical narratives which have had 
negative implications for those who exhibit PLE. In the spiritual context of the 
classical period such individuals were often stigmatised, being viewed as 
possessed or cursed. At that time, the humoural theory of disease offered a non-
stigmatising basis for the explanation of a whole range of presentations (including
physical illness), previously attributed to divine retribution. We begin to see the 
complexity of the operations of power over inner experience here – whilst the 
medical narrative challenged the power of religion to determine 'reality', the 
theory also allowed the physician to define a professional area, which excluded 
other practitioners, and allowed him to define 'reality' for the emergent 'patient' 
(McCarthy-Jones, 2012).
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Jumping forward to the early Christian period, in the Old Testament, PLE was 
positioned as potentially divine, and as a way in which God would communicate 
with humanity, and, later still, in the New Testament, PLE continued to signify 
divine communications. Such experiences were frequently reported by significant 
spiritual figures associated with the Church, and often bestowed significant status
to those considered eligible (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). At the time of Thomas of 
Aquinas (1225-1274), the Church was open to both spiritual, and more mundane 
physical explanations for PLE. Whether an experience was received as divine or 
mundane was determined by the Church, who also held the ultimate right to 
decide what the experience meant (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). This was a problem 
for those who represented a threat to the patriarchal church, for instance, women 
attempting to claim religious authority on the basis of PLE, whose experiences 
were frequently responded to with silencing, invalidation and persecution; which 
reached a frightening peak during the witchcraft craze of the fifteenth century 
(ibid.). Thus, in both the classical and early Christian periods, the power 
associated with PLE experiences, in offering an insight into divine 'reality', was 
oftentimes responded to by a mobilisation of existing authorities against such 
experiencers, and a refusal to allow them to determine their own meaning.
The Reformation in the sixteenth century led to a questioning of the Church's 
traditional interpretations of scripture, and an emphasis on individual 
interpretations (ibid.). This opened a space for PLE once again, as individuals 
made sense of their experiences in relation to the divine, and positioned 
themselves as prophets, mystics and visionaries. Foucault identifies in these 
alternate readings, particularly in collective readings, a 'counter-conduct' 
resistance against the Christian pastorate, which facilitated new ways-of-being 
(2006a). In response to this challenge, the Anglican Church adopted a new 
position, arguing that the age of supernatural intervention had come to an end, 
and re-positioning those claiming spiritual understandings of their PLE as misled 
fanatics (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). In denying the ‘reality’ of these experiences, 
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they found it necessary to take up and promote medical accounts of this 
phenomena, claiming that such experiences were the false perceptions of the 
insane. Thus, oddly, the Anglican Church became an early champion of the 
medical model of PLE.
This account was not immediately accepted by the general population, in part 
because medicine was very poor at treating its patients. However, the momentum
was with medicine, and by the middle of the 18th century PLE was generally 
understood by the educated elite as meaningless other than as a sign of 
pathology (MacDonald, 1983). As 'rationality' became an increasingly important 
concept throughout the 18th Century, PLE experience, as 'madness', became 
detrimentally associated with 'unreason', and was increasingly understood as a 
medical matter (Foucault, 1967).
Kraepelin provided the first clear articulation of the system of assumptions that 
underlies biological psychiatry's medical conceptualisation of 'mental illness'. He 
offered the world a systematised classification system of 'madness', to include 
dementia praecox, which would eventually develop into the constructs of 
'Schizophrenia' and 'Psychosis'. The meaning of these concepts, which seek to 
define PLE, has shifted over time. For instance, Bleuler (1950), in contributing to 
the development of the concept of Schizophrenia, gave descriptions of a 
condition that was nuanced, sensitive to the role of trauma, and to the notion that 
the symptoms are a response to intolerable situations (Watkins, 2010). Whereas 
advocates of a neo-kraepelinian movement, beginning in the 1970s and arguably 
continuing into the present, have used successive iterations of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association to articulate a 
medical understanding of PLE which, it has been argued, reduces the experience
to a symptom checklist (Bentall, 2009).
These shifting, more-or-less-shared meanings shape our experience (Hacking, 
1995). Hacking has shown how new kinds of scientific classification can have the 
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effect of 'making up' or bringing into being “a new kind of person, conceived of 
and experienced as a way to be a person” (2006:2). The contested concepts of 
'Psychosis' and 'Schizophrenia' are of what Hacking calls interactive kind, that is, 
the existence of these labels has implications for how those so classified are 
treated, and treat themselves. Hacking suggests that interactive kinds involve 
'looping effects', that is “ways in which the classification may interact with the 
people classified” (ibid:2). For instance, today we may think of people who 
experience what I am calling PLE as of a particular kind, e.g. Schizophrenic, and 
defined by a particular properties, e.g. symptoms, “but they are moving targets 
because our investigations interact with the targets themselves, and change 
them.  And since they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of people as
before. The target has moved. That is the looping effect” (ibid:2). Drawing on 
Hacking's work, we can see that the historically contingent development and 
cultural propagation of the concepts of ‘Schizophrenia’ and ‘Psychosis’, by 
offering new ways of being and describing a person, by creating a ‘thing’ that 
somebody could have (and be), shaped a new kind of personhood, strongly 
associated with PLE. This in turn created a new object of study, the 
Schizophrenic, the study of whom led to the ongoing development of the 
concepts which defined her. Hacking is not concerned with which descriptions are
‘true’, but with how the available discourses affect how we act, that is, we ‘act 
under a description’, and that which descriptions we can act under depends upon
which is available to the society in which we reside, at the time in which we reside
in it. 
Today we have multiple expert narratives about 'Schizophrenia' and 'Psychosis', 
including, but not limited to, neurological or biochemical abnormalities, the 
sequelae of trauma, ‘inadequate’ parenting, existential crisis and spiritual 
transformation (Lavender, 2000). For many decades in the 'West', psychiatry has 
been seen as the highest authority on 'madness', and thus, for many, on PLE 
(Williams, 2012). We have already seen, in section 1.5, the implications of the 
dominance of this narrative (which reifies boundary between the mentally sick 
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and normal people, and argues that medical treatment is essential) for 'patient' 
self-narratives, and material experiences.
Whilst the medical narrative is generally dominant, particularly in clinical contexts,
it remains, as ever, contested. Probably the most significant direct contestation of
current times is demonstrated by the increasing political and social influence of 
various groups who collectively are described as experts-by-experience (Adame 
& Leitner, 2008), and who offer various counter-narratives to psychiatry (e.g., 
Hearing Voices Network, Survivor movement). The Survivor movement is far from
a unified body, and encompasses many narratives (Campbell, 2008). Despite 
their lack of uniformity (or because of it), these movements have had significant 
implications for the medical model. For instance, in developing and promoting the
'recovery model' of mental illness (Anthony, 1993), which was quickly adopted by 
the MH system (Pilgrim, 2008). However, critical scholars argue that the way 
'recovery' is deployed in MH settings fails to challenge the medical narrative, in 
that it individualises suffering, simplistically reframes deficits as strengths, and 
requires individuals to change their own 'inappropriate' behaviours, feelings and 
beliefs, rather than effecting necessary social change (Harper & Speed, 2012).
Another modern day contestation of the medical narrative can be found in the 
academic literature. Classic examples abound, with Laing (1990) and Szasz 
(1976) being perhaps the most notable in standing critically opposed to the 
realism of psychiatry.  More recently, Leudar and Thomas (2000), Watkins (2010),
and Williams (2012) all offer examples of contemporary problematisations of the 
medical narrative. Troubling the medical framing of PLE as dysfunction or 
disease Williams and Watkins both present understandings of 'psychosis' as 
essential functional, whilst Leudar and Thomas argue that the experience is 
essentially ordinary and unhelpfully mythologised or pathologised. These 
understandings, as well as the persistent existence of spiritual and religious 
discourses, and the aforementioned activities of experts-by-experience, 
contribute to a modern day narrative landscape that remains diverse, albeit 
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dominated by medical discourse.
The purpose then, of this brief review, is to demonstrate that over time PLE has 
been understood in very different ways. As Hacking's (2006) work suggests, it is 
important to recognise these shifting narratives as more than simply stories. Each
one represents an entire 'reality', of course vastly simplified here, which 
determines the lived experience of the individual, and how they are responded to.
1.7.2. Cross-cultural narratives
“The mystic […] enters the waters and finds he can swim; whereas the
schizophrenic, unprepared, unguided and ungifted has fallen or 
unintentionally plunged and is drowning.”
Campbell (1972:216)
Tobert (2007) draws on anthropological evidence to argue that which narratives 
are dominant and which subjugated, in relation to mystical-spiritual-psychotic-like 
experience, varies between cultures. Unfamiliar knowledges are sometimes 
described as 'culture-bound beliefs', unfortunately, we are not always reflexive 
enough to question whether our own rational-material beliefs might also be 
'culture-bound' (Tobert, 2010). From a spiritual perspective, modern mainstream 
psychiatric beliefs about the psyche have been criticised for being overly narrow, 
and demonstrating limited awareness of their own historical and cultural 
contingency (Harner, 1990). The current Western/medical/dominant model is 
'ethnocentric'; based upon a western-material world-view which considers its own
perspective superior to any other. Within this narrative matter is primary, with life, 
consciousness and intelligence accidental by-products; whilst spirituality reflects 
ignorance and primitive magical thinking. The narrative is also 'cognicentric', 
basing its theories wholly upon ordinary states of consciousness, and 
systematically avoiding or misrepresenting non-ordinary states (ibid.).
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These biases of the dominant narrative suppress alternative 'belief' systems. 
Good (1994) argued that when we use the word 'belief' we really connote 
'falsehood', and mean to dismiss the point of view as primitive or irrational, 
although this is seldom made explicit. From a narrative perspective this is a 
serious analytic failing for, as we have seen, the narratives available to us  
structure our experience of 'reality' (Sarbin, 1986). Supporting the role of 
narrative in determining 'reality', Warner (2005) suggests that societies which 
value the spiritual realm have better 'Schizophrenia' prognosis. I will review two 
'cultural narratives', selected because they demonstrate the central and varied 
role narrative plays in shaping experience.
1.7.2.1. Shamanism
Narratives determine how individuals and communities understand and respond 
to PLE. Warner (2005) describes how certain understandings mobilise broad 
community involvement, and aid social reintegration. This kind of 'social sanction' 
of PLE is structured and supported by the ancient Shamanic narrative; it 
demonstrates the kind of community response an alternative understanding can 
mobilise, and the material implications for all involved.
A Shaman is a healer, who regularly enters non-ordinary states of consciousness
(Kalweit, 2000). The career of many Shamans begins with a 'calling', a powerful 
and involuntary visionary episode – a PLE. Some Siberian Shamans “during the 
period of the call, are violently insane for several years” (Benedict, 1934:267). 
Once the initiation is complete, the Shamanic narrative supports a return to the 
community, and the opportunity to re-define oneself as a fully-functioning and 
revered figure (Kalweit, 2000). Following the initiatory crisis PLE often remains, 
but this is expected and culturally sanctioned; the Shaman is typically able to 
enter non-ordinary states of consciousness at will (doing so to heal others, obtain
information, or influence the material world), and is able to control these states 
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(Tobert, 2010). 
This narrative shapes madness, sickness and suffering as spiritual 
transformation. In this 'reality', PLE signals a metamorphosis, which, once 
survived, acts positively on identity. The community confers onto the Shaman 
recognition, status, and the power to define 'reality'; all denied to the 'mental 
patient'. The community also supports the initial 'reading' of PLE within the 
Shamanic narrative as “other members of the tribe must help him to disentangle 
what he has seen and heard” (Kalweit, 2000:87). Shamanic initiates are typically 
supported by an experienced Shaman, and their transitions are reinforced by 
rites of passage which celebrate and solidify the spiritual dimension (ibid.). 
Silverman (1967:29) suggested that this level of support is “all too often 
completely unavailable to the schizophrenic in our culture”, which is still true 
today. Whilst the Shamanic narrative is increasingly available to the 'West', (as 
revivalists draw on historical and cultural descriptions of Shamanism to produce 
online resources, books, workshops, trainings, groups and therapies), such 
understandings are distinctly marginalised in our current context, and do not 
engender broad community support. 'Western' Shamanic sub-communities have 
the potential to be influential for those who recognise in their PLE something like 
'a calling', and wish to reject a medical understanding, but rarely offer a culturally 
sanctioned Shamanic role.
1.7.2.2. Kundalini    Awakening
Narratives which are culturally compatible may be more likely to be taken up. I 
now explore how the physiological focus of the Kundalini narrative makes it 
potentially more accessible to a 'Western' audience.
Classical Kundalini Awakening, described in historical Indian yogic literature from 
the eighth century BC, is a movement of internal energy through 'chakras' in the 
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body, said to mark 'spiritual' purification, and to bestow a state of enlightenment 
(Turner et al., 1995). Within this tradition, practitioners work for many years, 
under expert tutelage, to learn to guide, control or release this energy; finally 
achieving an 'awakening' said to represent the practitioners reintegration with 
'atman', one's 'true' self (Selby et al., 1992). 
The Kundalini narrative was significantly altered as it travelled west. For instance 
by Krishna (1970), who used Kundalini to describe his own turbulent spiritual 
awakening; contributing to a 'Western' understanding of Kundalini which 
incorporated relatively extreme PLE, probably beyond that typical of the classical 
experience. Following its popularisation during the so-called counterculture 
movement, a 'new age' Kundalini narrative developed, “connected with the 
classical kundalini awakening of Eastern spiritual traditions only by theory and 
circumstantial evidence” (Greyson, 1993:288). As Kundalini was repackaged for a 
'Western' audience, previously requisite ascetic practices were marginalised, and 
personal enlightenment and out-of-the-ordinary experience promoted.
The yogic focus on observable physiological responses provides a meaningful, 
nuanced and self-verifiable framework for comprehending the out-of-the-ordinary 
'pre-narrative' qualia of PLE. Being grounded in physiology may also have 
facilitated Kundalini being co-opted into medical, and pseudo-medical, discourse 
– which lends the narrative sub-cultural credibility. Bentov (1977) integrated the 
yogic descriptions with modern anatomical knowledge, creating the 'physio-
kundalini syndrome'; which included “strong and unusual bodily reactions and 
unusual psychological states”. Both Krishna and Bentov note the resemblance 
between an early stage Kundalini awakening and 'psychosis'; for instance, a 
'physio-kundalini' episode might involve 'internal voices' and 'observing oneself, 
including one's thoughts, as if one were a bystander' (Greyson, 1993). These 
authors, and many Transpersonal psychologists, argue that Kundalini 
awakenings are 'spiritual emergencies'' and must be distinguished from 
'psychosis' (e.g., Grof, 2012).
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The importation and 'westernisation' of the Kundalini narrative facilitates storying 
some kinds of PLE outside of the medical frame (supported by a literature which 
lends credibility), and potential sub-cultural validation and co-construction 
opportunities. Storied thus, PLE marks the beginning of a spiritual 'purificatory 
process', leading to the healing of unconscious psychic material. Kundalini 
awakening is universally accessible, and necessary for enlightenment, thus, the 
experiencer is positioned as more in touch with 'reality' than 'normal' individuals. 
Conventional psychiatric knowledge is undermined, as it is the psychiatrist who 
'lacks insight', reversing the dilemma of the MH 'patient'. Indeed, psychiatric 
responses to Kundalini are seen as frustrating the process and, therefore, 
actively harmful (Sanella, 1987). Naturally, the Kundalini narrative also offers 
hope and meaningfulness, as the expected end result is profound spiritual 
development (ibid.).
House (2010) suggested that all experiences currently labelled 'psychotic' might 
be more usefully understood and responded to within the Kundalini narrative; and
that those who experience PLE without such a theoretical framework may well 
fear for their sanity. House contends that PLE is actually less of a 'problem' than 
is our lack of understanding of its 'spiritual' importance, and our attempts to 
suppress it; which lead us to offer treatments which cause “profound violence” by 
retarding a meaningful process. 
In summary, PLE experiences can be narrated in different ways, with significant 
implications for self-narrative; and alternative cultural narratives can be drawn 
upon in 'Western' contexts. The extent to which this is possible may be 
determined by the level of community support and the goodness-of-fit between 
the narrative, pre-narrative experience, and the local narrative landscape.
1.7.3. Alternative psychological narratives
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The notion that madness and spirituality share common ground entered the 
psychological field in its infancy, with William James (1902:337):
“Religious mysticism is only one half of mysticism. The other half has 
no accumulated traditions except those which the text-books on 
insanity supply. Open any one of these, and you will find abundant 
cases in which 'mystical ideas' are cited as characteristic symptoms of 
enfeebled or deluded states of mind.”
Since James, a number of researchers have addressed the spiritual and 
transformative aspects of PLE, and tried to account for overlapping 
phenomenology of spiritual and psychotic experiences. This body of theory 
positions 'psychosis' as a natural growth-oriented process, thickening the medical
model counter-narrative. Furthermore, in doing so it offers a narrative framework 
that seeks to reconnect spiritual and rational ways of knowing, and to reinstate 
the meaning of PLE by bridging it back into 'consensus reality'. This literature 
offers yet another narrative reservoir for those with PLEs, and one potentially 
more accessible within the MH context. 
Carl Jung (1960) might be identified as the forerunner. Jung experienced a period
of something very like 'psychosis' himself, and subsequently asserted that 
'psychoses' are potentially constructive, image-driven intrusions of unconscious 
material into the ego. He maintained that PLE was a universal part of human 
experience, and saw the process as typically functional, i.e., as the beginning of a
healing process to correct unbalanced beliefs which were out of line with the 
collective unconscious. Nevertheless, Jung did not completely reject a medical 
understanding of PLE; he felt that the 'Schizophrenic' could not maintain ego 
integrity in the face of such an intrusion, resulting in “self destruction... a 
disintegration of the means of expression and communication” (p.253), 
introducing a binary distinction that has persisted throughout the literature.
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Perry (1999) was a Jungian-oriented psychiatrist and clinical director of a 
medication-free residential facility for young adults diagnosed with 'psychosis'. He
developed Jung's ideas, suggesting that 'psychosis' is intentionally initiated by the
unconscious “when a person finds herself in a state of acute distress, in 
circumstances that have assailed her most sensitive vulnerabilities” (p.21). Thus, 
Perry's narrative offers a re-conceptualisation of 'psychosis'; not as the original 
problem, but as an attempted solution to a serious problem which pre-existed it. 
He believed that this process drew a disproportionate amount of energy into the 
'organismic system', leaving little energy for higher functions, causing the 
individual to be flooded with 'archetypal affect-images', and inner and outer 
'reality' to become confused. Understood this way, 'psychosis' is a process of 
'renewal of the self', potentially culminating in greater 'lovingness', 'compassion' 
and 'unity'. Perry claimed that around 80% of his residents completed this 
process, and went on 'developing' after leaving the facility. He believed this 
'renewal' necessitated a profound disintegration, leaving the individual 
temporarily 'vulnerable'; and identified the cultural reception to 'Schizophrenia' in 
Western society as likely to block this natural process, leaving the individual 
indefinitely confused.
Laing (1960; 1967; 1970) further 'thickens' this narrative. He suggested that if 
one's sense of being is compromised by external insult, such that one lacks 
existential solidity, a certain permeability of the self is created. This openness 
may have advantages in terms of increased creativity, sensitivity, and potentially, 
access to spiritual experiences – but problematises 'normal' existence, and is 
occasionally terrifying. Laing argued that what Freud called the 'unconscious' is 
merely what we, in our culture, are 'unconscious' of; he saw the process of 
entering the inner world of the unconscious as natural, but culturally-
unaccommodated. In line with cultural understandings like Kundalini, which 
position experiencers as in touch with a 'higher reality', Laing argued that those 
who enter such domains, through transcendental experiences, or 'Schizophrenia',
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have access to something which is 'real' in a different way from a dream, 
imagination or fantasy. His central thesis being that our modern world, in pursuing
a deeper knowledge of the outer world, has lost touch with 'inner realities', and 
that 'Schizophrenia' was best understood as a sane reaction to an insane world.
More recently Jackson's (2010) 'paradigm shifting process model' proposed that 
both benign 'mystical' experience and 'psychosis' are instantiations of a “basic, 
adaptive psychological process, which is also observed in artistic and scientific 
creativity” (Jackson, 2001:185). Both experiences begin with the same underlying
intention of resolving an intractable existential problem: PLE is triggered in the 
response to conflict, with the intended function of 'paradigm shifting', i.e., radically
adjusting firmly held beliefs. PLEs have sufficient emotional intensity to effectively
destabilise existing intransigent beliefs, and the content of the experience may 
offer insights into the original conflict; thus, the process is understood as “a form 
of creativity which reflects unconscious processing of the problem” (Jackson, 
2010:142). Jackson suggests that the difference between the two phenomena is 
that, whilst in the case of 'mystical' experience the process resolves the conflict (a
negative feedback loop), in the case of a 'psychotic' experience no resolution is 
found (and an escalating positive feedback loop is initiated, creating a 'florid 
psychotic disorder').
Transpersonal psychology is relatively unique amongst the current psy-disciplines
for taking seriously 'spiritual' and 'mystical' experiences. Some kinds of PLE, from
this perspective, become “Spiritual emergencies” – “manifestations of the deep 
recesses of the human psyche that are not ordinarily accessible”, and can be 
“healing and transformative” (Grof & Grof, 1989:6). Grof (2012) argues that 
because psychiatry fails to differentiate between 'mystical' states and 'mental 
illness', many are misdiagnosed, and inappropriately treated. Referencing 
alternative cultural narratives of 'psychosis', including Shamanism and Kundalini, 
he suggests that, properly supported, these states can lead to an evolution of 
consciousness. However, Transpersonal psychologists generally avoid 
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contestation with mainstream psychiatry, instead focusing their attention on 
distinguishing 'mystical' experiences from 'genuine psychosis', maintaining the 
validity of both constructs, and the necessity of medical intervention for 
'psychosis'. Thus, the spiritual emergency narrative is only officially available to 
those who receive psychiatric sanction.
Jackson (1997) troubled the notion that these two types of experience can be 
straightforwardly distinguished. He compared the accounts of individuals 
diagnosed with a 'psychotic disorder', who reported 'spiritual' experiences, to 
those who were undiagnosed but reported benign 'spiritual' PLE. Within his 
limited sample, he found counter-examples for each of the criteria suggested by 
the literature for differentiating 'spiritual' and 'psychotic' experience. Jackson 
concluded that the primary distinguishing factor was “the way in which psychotic 
phenomena are embedded in the values and beliefs of the person concerned” 
(Jackson & Fulford, 1997:41). Developing this research, Brett et al. (2007), and 
Lovatt et al. (2010), examined the appraisals and experiences of undiagnosed 
and diagnosed groups reporting PLE. Intensity of PLE failed to determine group 
membership, with the undiagnosed group frequently reporting more intense 
experiences. Supporting Jackson's findings, the key differentiating factor was that
the undiagnosed group were more likely to have started having experiences in 
socially congruent contexts, or within 'spiritual' practice. Understanding 
experiences as 'spiritual', and having social support, predicted lower levels of 
distress for both groups, whilst trying to control or suppress the experience was 
predictive of greater distress.
Extending this work further, Heriot-Maitland, Knight and Peters (2012) attempted 
to distinguish the factors involved in initiating a PLE, from those determining its 
outcome. The researchers once again compared a diagnosed to an undiagnosed 
group. For both groups PLE began following a period of 'negative emotion', 
generally accompanied by 'isolation' and 'deep contemplation'. Both experienced 
the PLE as providing 'emotional fulfilment' and 'deep insights', leading the authors
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to suggest that their findings provide evidence for 'psychosis' as a “psychological 
problem solving process” (p.50). However, once again, undiagnosed participants 
had been better able to incorporate their PLE into their lives. This was, in part, 
because they had prior conceptual knowledge and open attitudes towards PLE, 
and, in part, because they were accepted and validated by others. The diagnosed
group reported less validation, and saw their PLE as less desirable, and more 
permanent. The authors suggested that PLE is “adaptive and generally 
enhancing”, and that the subsequent development of 'psychosis' is determined by
whether the experience is coherently incorporated into one's life. So, not only 
does the psychological literature offer an alternative way of understanding PLE, it
also demonstrates the centrality of how the individual and their community 
understand PLE in determining its consequences.
Advocating for a paradigm shift in the way we understand 'psychosis', Clarke 
(2010:101) argues that 'psychosis' and 'spirituality' are different faces of a 
“universal human experience”. She positions herself against the historical 
agenda, which has been to distinguish healthy 'mysticism' from madness: arguing
that the most evidenced distinction, “the disaster that characteristically follows” 
(p.102), is not particularly stark; and further, that such a dichotomising approach 
results in an impoverished understanding of both phenomena. Instead she 
adopts the term 'transliminal' (i.e., that which is beyond the boundary of the self), 
to encompass both constructs.
Clarke distinguishes two possible modes of being accessible to humans: 
“ordinary consciousness”, and a “less focussed state” (p.104) associated with 
spiritual and 'psychotic' experience, but also more ordinary reveries, which is 'the 
transliminal'. Clarke seeks to support her narrative by integrating the 'transliminal'
with mainstream psychology's cognitive theory; for instance, drawing on the 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystem theory (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) to suggest 
that transliminal experiences occur when the propositional subsystem (which 
represents the 'logical mind') is in asynchrony with the implicational subsystem 
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(representing the perception of 'the whole'), meaning that “a different quality of 
experience becomes available” (Clarke, 2010:108), one driven by the 
implicational system, crucially this experience is no less 'real' or valuable than 
'ordinary consciousness'.
Clarke suggests that a “jolt” is required for most of us to move into such 
transliminal experience, but that for the 'psychotic' the barrier is “dangerously 
loose” (p.108). She suggests that crossing this barrier results in a state of 
groundlessness, experienced by some as blissful. For 'mystical' experiences in 
'spiritual' contexts the transition back to ordinary consciousness is a natural 
process. In 'psychosis' this orderly return does not happen; separated from their 
constructs, it becomes very difficult for the individual to operate in the world; 
subsequent grasping for meaning within this state can lead to the formation of 
delusions (Clark, 2010).
Once again the centrality of narrative is suggested when Clarke argues that the 
valorisation of productive scientific logic in 'Western' society, and the resultant 
cultural denial of “the logic of archetypes […] full of paradox and a sense of 
mystery” (p.110), marginalizes the transliminal, and problematises the transition 
back to ordinary consciousness, resulting in 'psychosis'. Hence, a society illiterate
in the discourse of 'spiritual' experience isolates those with PLE. However, she 
does not develop this argument further, and, along with other writers (e.g., Jung 
and Laing), concludes that it is 'ego strength' which determines whether these 
experiences are temporary and transformational or damaging and hard to 
escape. 
Williams (2012) offers a final variation of this psycho-spiritual narrative of 
'psychosis' which frames PLE as universally accessible, and generally 
transformative. He explicitly integrates several models of PLE, including those 
discussed above, with 'Eastern' understandings. Williams proposes two universal 
existential dilemmas: “the need to maintain the survival of a dualistic self with a 
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world that is fundamentally non-dual”; and, “the need to maintain a balance 
between autonomy and connection with others” (p.192). How psychologically 
flexible we are is determined by the width of our 'window of tolerance' (WOT) 
between these conflicting 'isolation' and 'engulfment' anxieties. When we have 
experiences outside of the WOT, the psyche “utilizes whatever strategy is 
necessary to bring one's experience and one's WOT back into alignment” (ibid.). 
When adjustments directly to the environment are not possible, the psyche 
initiates 'psychosis'; destabilizing one's cognitive constructs in order to change 
one's perception of the environment, and opening one up to unitive experiences, 
“with the intention that these experiences will be fully integrated” (p.181). 
Personal growth in this model is represented by the resultant diminishment of 
both isolation and engulfment anxiety as the WOT widens. Williams argues that it
is essential that this process be allowed to unfold, and suggests that the nature of
the support given during an episode may to some extent impact upon the 
outcome. However, Williams (like Clarke), suggests that a strong observing ego 
differentiates 'peak experiences' from what gets labelled 'genuine psychosis', 
although he is clear that he does not consider them fundamentally different 
experiences. 
Returning to narrative theory, since we are not understood as having identity  
independent of our position in the social world, the discourses available to us, 
and the discourses used by others about us, restrict and shape how we construct 
our 'self' (Burr, 1995). Rather than deferring to the construct of 'ego strength', 
which has the potential to be deployed in a pathologising fashion, we might 
usefully consider the role of local narrative resources, that is, what ways of 
storying their PLE are available to the individual? What can be said (and 
becomes 'true') about the individual who experiences PLE in a given context? It 
seems that the potential explanatory value of narrative has been overlooked in 
favour of more traditional psychological theorising, which, in attempting to offer 
totalising explanations, marginalises context.
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1.8. Spiritually Transformative Self-Narratives
We have seen that, from a narrative perspective, understanding 'psychosis' as 
medical can be harmful, and that 'spiritual' and transformative understandings of 
PLE lead to positive outcomes. However, very little attention has been given, 
even in the qualitative literature, to the stories of those who describe 
transformative experiences of 'psychosis', nor to the self-narratives of those who 
realise these alternative narratives in the face of a dominant medical paradigm. 
McCarthy-Jones et al., (2013) identified 97 (n=1942) qualitative studies of some 
aspect of 'psychosis' published between January 2000 and May 2010. Their 
meta-analysis generated four themes, synthesising the principle findings of the 
literature as a whole. First, most studies described how 'unshared perceptions' 
led to disruptions of shared 'reality'. Second, most studies identified a transition 
from feeling that one was having unusual but manageable experiences, to 
coming to believe that support of some kind was needed; although most 
individuals only accessed professional systems once they felt they could no 
longer cope, and did so with trepidation. Third, they found that sense-making, 
detachment from experiences, and for some medication, could support 
participants in re-establishing a sense of self, and either re-joining consensus 
'reality' or otherwise coming to a 'meaningful reality' of their own. The final theme,
supporting the notion of 'psychosis' as potentially transformative, was 'better than 
new', so called because, for many, 'recovery' represented not simply a restoring 
of the old self, but the development of an enhanced self.
Thus, despite the 'rhetoric of scientific sadness', 'better than new' represents a 
prevalent theme in the qualitative literature. These 'better and new' accounts 
generally appear as tangential to the overall purpose of the studies they emerge 
from. Whilst many studies have examined 'recovery' narratives in the MH context,
few published studies directly examine this 'better than new' experience, and 
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fewer still 'spiritual' or 'mystical' narratives of 'psychosis' (Nixon et al., 2009). It 
seems the medical paradigm is restricting researchers from looking beyond 
clinical settings, despite such accounts being readily available, and potentially 
paradigm-shifting. Adame and Hornstein (2006) highlighted that nearly 600 
English-language first-person narratives of madness had already been published.
These accounts represent an untapped resource, offering an underutilised 
alternative to medical conceptions of 'mental illness', wherein the apparent 
simplicity of diagnosis is replaced with complexity and meaningfulness. In line 
with much of the research above, many of these accounts describe a 
transformative experience of 'psychosis', often framing this as spiritual or mystical 
experience (Hornstein, 2011). I will now review the few studies that examine this 
phenomenon directly.
Peter K. Chadwick, a clinical psychologist, who has also “been psychotic” 
(2010:64) offers his own PLE narrative as a 'self-case study' (1997, 2010). He 
describes a childhood filled with hatred from all sides, and subsequently 
developing an “utterly wretched” self-identity (2010:67). Chadwick describes his 
first 'psychotic' experience, in 1979, as a portal opening; he was “a vessel being 
filled with the divine light of god” (ibid.). Some months later, he experienced the 
reversal of this state, when 'mystical' thoughts warped into 'psychotic' ones. 
Chadwick, continues to view his experiences as meaningful, and describes 
having been transformed by the experience of what he calls 'positive 
permeability', which opened him up to creativity, art, spirituality, and sexuality. He 
offers a theoretically informed view of his experience which acknowledges both 
'spiritual' and biological aspects. Chadwick urges us not to ignore the 'spiritual' 
aspects of 'recovery', and warns against the damaging potential of pessimistic 
clinicians, who fail to see the positive side of 'Schizophrenia'. He insists that no 
one perspective; be it biochemical, cognitive, or spiritual, could ever fully 
encompass 'psychosis'.
Kaiser (2004) offers another transformative self-case study. He shares his story in
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the hope of making a contribution to “healing our deeply wounded humanity” 
(p.432), and acknowledges the contribution of others' stories in his own journey. 
He argues that meaninglessness was the most awful aspect of his experience, 
leading him to feel that he did not really exist; hence, creating meaning was 
crucial to his survival. He refuses to define himself in relation to psychiatric labels,
arguing that his experience of a “seemingly eternal, lived death” (p.443) was 
transformational. He feels able to live more fully now, because he has known the 
anguish of the absence of life, which has developed his presence and empathy. 
Kaiser notes influences on his thinking from existential philosophy, psychology, 
and literature and suggests that the meaning contained in these works rescued 
him from 'psychosis'. This meaning “is the liberating truth that suffering does not 
have to be experienced as irreparably damaging and meaningless but, rather can
be experienced as enlivening, meaningful, and sacred source of transformation 
and healing” (p.451).
These self-case studies, alongside self-narratives outside the psychological 
literature, offer valuable insights into the subjective experience of 'psychosis' and 
transformation, and seem to support the theory reviewed above. Arguably 
though, the self-case study approach is limited by its lack of critical distance. 
Several broader studies, examining similar phenomena, have been conducted.
Thornhill et al. (2004) were amongst the first to examine interview-produced 
narratives of those who self-identified as 'recovered', or 'recovering', from 
'psychosis'. One of three core 'genres' they identified was 'enlightenment'; a 
central element of which was “the sudden or gradual dawning of understanding, 
bringing a new perspective” (p.189). Enlightenment narratives positioned PLEs 
as part of an ongoing journey. Often these experiences involved facing and 
reconceptualising previous trauma or abuse. 'Psychotic' processes were seen as 
offering insight into important psychological and existential issues so that “the 
psychosis itself can herald the start of a journey of self-discovery” (p.194). The 
authors did not attend in any detail to the production or co-construction of the 
32
narratives themselves, but did suggest that meaning-making was important to 
'recovery'; that spiritual narratives can be transformative; and that current MH 
practice impedes this process. 
Nixon, Hagen, and Peters (2009) conducted a small, but ground-breaking, 
phenomenological analysis of narrative interviews with six individuals who 
considered themselves to have had a 'transformative experience' of 'psychosis'. 
They identified three 'phases' in these accounts. The 'Pre-Psychosis Phase' 
comprised themes of childhood foreshadowing and negative events common to 
all participants. The 'Psychosis Phase' included compromised day-to-day 
functioning, relatively sudden onset of 'psychosis', psychic intuitiveness and 
unusual visual experiences. All of their participants also reported experiences of 
dying and being close to the divine. The final phase, 'Transformation of 
Psychosis', seemed to be driven by 'mindfulness and detachment', 'accepting the 
dissolution of time into now', 'realignment of career path' and 'embracing a 
spiritual path'. They concluded that all of their participants “chose to understand 
their [PLE] as an invitation to embark on a transformational journey” (p.541) 
rather than accept a medical identity, and, as a result, benefited from the 
experience. Once again, how these understandings were constructed, and what 
facilitated this, was not examined.
Williams (2012) conducted a multiple-case study thematic analysis of six 
individuals who self-identified as transformed by a 'long term psychosis', aiming 
to explore changes in his participants' 'personal paradigms' from onset to full 
recovery. He identified parallels in their experiences in relation to six 
preconfigured categories of experience (e.g., 'the onset and deepening of 
psychosis' and 'lasting personal paradigm shifts'). The onset was associated with 
an overwhelming existential threat to the self; to which, Williams suggests, 
'psychosis' was a response, initiated by the psyche, to re-establish equilibrium. 
'Recovery' involved reconnecting with hope, meaning, and a sense of agency; 
and psychiatric involvement generally frustrated this process. Finally, resolution 
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of the process entailed a profound reorganisation of the self. Most of his 
participants drew on 'spiritual' and 'mystical' understandings to organise their 
narratives (e.g., around 'enlightenment', 'spirit quests', or 'mediumship'), but this 
was not the focus of Williams' study (which was to establish the coherence of his 
own model); and the role of narrative, or implications of available discursive 
resources, was not considered in any detail.
1.9. The Proposed Study and Rationale
The proposed study will take a Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA) approach to 
phenomena explored by Nixon et al. (2010) and Williams (2012). I extend their 
work by drawing on Positioning theory to explore, in-depth, how three individuals 
narrate their PLE as 'spiritually transformative' and reject the 'patient' identity. I 
am interested in how 'spiritual' or 'mystical' narratives shape the experience of 
PLE, and the responses of others to it. In particular, how such a position is taken 
up; that is, what discursive work is done in the maintenance of that position. 
Drawing on Foucauldian theory, I explore the discourses they draw upon in 
constituting themselves as subjects; and what such a position affords them in 
relation to the MH narrative. 
By attending to how people construct 'spiritual' or 'mystical' narratives in relation 
to dominant narratives which shape their social worlds (particularly when these 
storylines become oppressive), we might come to understand more about the 
construction and operations of the medical model narrative itself.
I will make no claims as to the representativeness of the sample, rather I am 
interested that such a narrative can exist in our culture, and in understanding its 
operations. Restated, I am concerned with the actual realisation and deployment 
of spiritual-transformative narratives in our current cultural context.
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1.10. Research Questions
In examining these narratives I will attempt to address the following questions:
1. How do individuals who have had spiritually transformative PLEs, story 
these experiences?
2. What kind of identities are created?
3. Which narrative resources do they draw upon?
4. What does this afford them in relation to the medical narrative? 
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2. METHOD
Having presented a rationale for my research questions, the following chapter 
describes how they have been addressed within this study. The research 
questions, being both explorative and process-orientated, lend themselves to a 
qualitative approach (Willig, 2008). The questions are concerned with the 
subjective interpretation of experience by individuals drawing on culturally 
available discursive resources to create narratives which in turn establish 'selves' 
that have functions in the social world. They are, therefore, suited to a narrative 
approach, which considers positioning and the discursive context. This chapter 
describes the process through which three publicly available narratives were 
identified online, and subjected to a Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA) grounded in
Positioning theory, and supplemented by a Foulcauldian critique.
2.1. Research Aims
This study aims to explore three case-studies; public narratives of individuals who
offer understandings of their 'Psychosis-Like-Experiences' (PLE) within 'spiritual' 
or 'mystical' frameworks, in spite of dominant psychiatric discourses; and who 
make the additional claim to have been beneficially transformed by this PLE. I am
interested in how the narrators draw on various narrative resources to make 
sense of their unusual experiences, how they position themselves in 
communicating this to others, and what this makes available to them. More 
specifically I am interested in the implications of these factors for the process of 
subjectification, i.e., the identities they are able to construct. I am also interested 
in the relationship between these problematising narratives and the dominant 
medical model, that is, what are the conditions of possibility of these narratives, 
and what this might reveal about the operations of a supposedly dominant 
psychiatric discourse?
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2.2. Epistemology
The position taken in this project can be described as critical-realist social-
constructionist. This is a complex stance which I will briefly unpack. Social 
constructionism is not a “single and unified position”, but should be understood as
a developing dialogue, comprised of multiple positions and points of origin 
(Gergen & Gergen, 2003:2). Similarities between social constructionist 
approaches are perhaps best considered 'family resemblances' (Burr, 2003:2). 
Broadly, following Burr (2003), social constructionists approaches are brought 
together through their adoption of one or more key assumptions: They are 
interested in how phenomena are seen, rejecting an underlying 'reality'; They are 
interested in the generation of knowledge – its construction; They reject the 
universal knowledge claims of direct realists, and set out to question these, as 
well as more 'everyday' assumptions. To do so they privilege the social, historical 
and cultural context of such knowledges.
Social constructionist approaches take varying position on ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ 
(Burr, 2003). Critical realist thinkers argue for a 'reality' outside of discourse 
(Willig, 1999). Whereas 'relativist' thinkers maintain that “there is nothing outside 
of the text” (Derrida, 1976:158). By taking up a critical realist position I hope to 
avoid the potential perils of 'naive social constructionism' which can minimize the 
importance of materiality and embodiment, and become politically paralysing 
(Smail, 2004). Perhaps more pertinently, I hope to go beyond the text by situating
my analysis in a broader historical, cultural and social context. In doing so, I hope
to be able to include in my analysis factors 'critical realists' would consider to be 
of extra-discursive ontology, experiences 'outside the realm of language' and 
within 'material practices', thus positioning the text 'within the materiality' that 
must be negotiated (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007).
Thus, in claiming that PLE can be best understood as a social construction, I do 
not mean to deny that experiences like 'psychosis' exist. Instead I mean to 
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examine the 'reality' of PLE produced by specific narratives in particular contexts.
2.3. Methodology
The method is designed to identify narratives online which satisfy my inclusion 
criteria, without unduly restricting which accounts might be included. To subject 
the suitable accounts to a rigorous and novel analysis which explores the 
narrative work being done in these accounts, and to ask these accounts to speak 
back against the discursive environment in which they are situated.
2.3.2. 'Critical Narrative Analysis'
“As it turns out, simply using the notion of narrative as an organising 
principle does not tell us how to undertake narrative analysis. 
Narrative-based analysis is not a method as such but rather a 
theoretical approach to interpreting people’s talk.”
Stephens and Breheny, (2013:14)
Whilst narrative analysis may be suited to a study focused on the co-construction 
of self through autobiography, it is necessary to determine how such an analysis 
should be organised. I employed a method of narrative analysis modified from 
Langdridge's (2007) CNA for two principle reasons: Firstly, CNA, being 
idiographic, with a strong emphasis on understanding 'life stories' is well suited to
case-study work; Secondly, the key distinction of CNA is “the inclusion of a critical
moment, where an attempt is made to interrogate the text using aspects of social 
theory as a hermeneutic of suspicion” (p.130), which allowed me to bring into my 
analysis some concepts from Foucault's 'toolbox', but more on this later. 
Langdridge (2007) suggests that his method should be adapted to fit the data. It 
should be noted that, herein, it is substantially altered by removal of the 'realist' 
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phenomenological 'hermeneutic of empathy', which is replaced by an 
understanding of 'selfhood' rooted in 'relativist' Positioning theory. In many ways it
may be simpler to consider this an independent Critical Narrative Analysis, 
although I am indebted to Langdridge for providing a comprehensive and flexible 
analytic structure.
2.3.2.1. Rationale    for   Positioning  t heory
Positioning theory (Davies & Harré; 1990, 1999) explores how selves are 
discursively produced in social interaction. Positioning is defined as “the 
discursive process whereby people are located in conversations as observably 
and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced storylines” (Davies & 
Harré, 1999:37). For Moghaddam et al. (2003:140) it is “concerned with the 
process by which short-term and small-scale moral orders are established and 
maintained, and with the way the actions of participants are constrained to flow in
accordance with sharply delimited schemata or conventions.” Positioning theory 
can be contrasted with Role theory (Goffman, 1959); roles are relatively fixed, 
formally defined and stable, whereas positions are constantly negotiated. 
Positioning theory states that the identity is 'ongoingly' produced, and always in 
relation to the 'ongoing' production of other selves (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003). 
We understand ourselves and others through idiosyncratic narratives, storylines, 
which enable us to make sense of actions as social acts. By positioning one's self
within a storyline, one opens a complimentary position for the audience (which 
they may accept or reject). The delimiting attributes of the discursive environment
(the moral order), and the power of the speech-act, determine whether one is 
able to legitimise a position, i.e., one's illocutionary force. Thus, storyline, or 
narrative, is a principle determining factor in how individuals position themselves, 
or are positioned. Positioning theory also attends to the rights and duties 
associated with taking up a particular position, which influence how an identity is 
enacted. A triangular relationship between position, storyline, and speech act is 
central to meaning-making; an understanding of this relationship underpins 
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Positioning theory (van Langenhove & Harré, 1999).
Hence, within Positioning theory, 'identity' means being “recognized as a certain 
kind of person by others” (Gee, 2001:99). Bringing analytic attention to roles, 
duties and alignments gives us an insight to the 'identities' created, and the work 
that they do. We can see that identities must be situated and produced with an 
audience in mind; and investigate how a narrator tailors their story to their 
audience. Positioning theory offers a conceptual tool to explore the selves 
presented in the narratives, their 'functions' and the duties and rights that these 
identities confer. 
2.3.2.2. Rationale    for   a   Foucauldian  “h ermeneutic    of  s uspicion  ”
Ricouer (1996) states that we always see, and speak, from a particular position, 
whether or not this is acknowledged. Langdridge (2007) takes up this idea in 
developing his CNA method. He argues for the inclusion of a “hermeneutic of 
suspicion”, i.e., a critical theory deployed as “an alternative way of seeing: not a 
way that reveals the truth hidden beneath the surface, but rather a way of taking 
up an alternative position” (ibid:136), and thereby allowing the analyst to look at 
the material in a new way. To this end I employed a Foucauldian 'hermeneutic of 
suspicion' in my analysis. It is worthy of note that this affected the way I 
connected with and understood the data. However, to return to Ricouer, our 
understanding is necessarily shaped by the lens through which we view the 
world. All approaches to data analysis, quantitative and qualitative, require that 
the data is viewed from a particular position, whether this be explicit or implicit. 
What is crucial, particularly for the qualitative researcher, is to acknowledge the 
lens through which the data has been seen.
Adopting a Foulcauldian lens will illuminate certain aspects of the data and 
obscure others. Indeed a central feminist critique of Foucault's work is that his 
theorising on subjectivity is limited, and that he has little to say about subject 
positioning (McNay, 1992). In taking up this approach these aspects of 
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experience might be obscured. What the inclusion of Foucauldian theory brings to
this analysis is a nuanced consideration of material-discursive factors, hidden 
structures and cultural dynamics often beyond the scope of more embodied 
approaches, and a focus on power. This allows for the problematisation of ideas 
which might otherwise seem self-evident. Recently a combination or dual-focus 
approach has appeared in the qualitative literature which demonstrates that 
analytic methods with different foci and epistemologies can be usefully drawn 
together to produce more comprehensive analyses (Colahan, Tunariu & Dell, 
2012); this current research follows in that tradition.
I will not attempt a summary of Foucault's oeuvre, which is very complex, and of 
shifting emphasis, instead I defer to his own summary:
“My objective [...] has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt 
with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into 
subjects.
The first is the modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of 
sciences; for example, the objectivizing of the speaking subject in 
grammaire generale, philology, and linguistics. […].
In the second part of my work, I have studied the objectivizing of the 
subject in what I shall call “dividing practices”. The subject is either divided 
inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. [For 
example] the mad and the sane […].
Finally, I have sought to study [...] the way a human being turns himself 
[sic] into a subject. For example, I have chosen the domain of sexuality—
how men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of “sexuality”.”
Foucault, (2003a:126)
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Foucault produced a massive body of theory; in calling on this theory to support 
my analysis it is necessary to be selective, and to adopt a 'toolbox' approach to 
this selection:
 “I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can 
rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish 
in their own area” 
Translation, O’Farrell, (2005:50)
Foucault's ideas changed over time, and there are countless ways in which these
ideas might be employed in an analysis. Indeed, modern day Foucauldian 
approaches use these 'tools' in many different ways to drive their analyses. For 
instance, Mary Gordon (2011) utilises his focus on pastoral power and 
technologies of the self in her analysis of the relationship between teachers and 
Irish traveller pupils; whereas Jean O'Callaghan (2009) developed a method 
drawing on his notion of an ethical fourfold to make visible the discursive terrain 
of students ethical relationships with themselves in relation to procrastination. 
Willig (2008) argues that there is no single correct method in conducting a FDA, 
and that this heterogeneity is a strength of the approach. The particular 'tools' 
drawn upon must be determined by the fit between 'tool', data, and research 
question, as perceived by the researcher. In taking up a 'toolbox' approach, and 
adopting only specific Foucauldian concepts, I am following in this tradition. I will 
now outline key ideas or 'tools' I have taken up in bringing part of Foucault's 
thinking to bear on the narratives.
Each period of his work lends something to the analysis. In the first period his 
objective was to understand how people were made subjects through “regimes of
truth”. Of particular relevance to my analysis is his exposition of how psychiatry 
transformed human beings into a particular kind of subject.
In his second period Foucault studied “dividing practices” - those manipulations 
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which combine 'scientific' discriminations and practices of exclusion, to produce 
docile and regulated subjects. He came to believe that “power and knowledge 
directly imply one another [...] there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1977:27). His 
nuanced exploration of technologies of power illuminated the “micro-physics of 
power” at the level of the body; how it operates diffusely, and is made up of 
“dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings” (ibid:26). Of 
particular relevance is the productive nature of 'power-knowledge':
“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in 
negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it 
“masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality”  
(Foucault, 1977:194)
My analysis attends to the normalising/disciplining practices of medicine and the 
“psy-complex” (Rose, 1979), which act upon identity construction, within the 
contested sphere of the mental health system. Further, I consider what other 
productive forms of power are drawn on throughout the narratives (e.g. religious 
authority, popular science).
Foucault's final period focussed on subjectification, and is most relevant to this 
analysis. At this time Foucault became “interested in the interaction between 
oneself and others, and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode 
of action that an individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies 
of the self” (2003a:147). Technologies of the self “permit individuals to effect by 
their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves” (Foucault, 2003b:46).
Foucault developed his conception of 'resistance' through technologies of the 
self. For him, 'resistance' is enacted through a self-constitution grounded in 
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critique (Thompson, 2003). “Critique will be the art of voluntary inservitude, of 
reflective indocility. The essential function of critique would be that of de-
subjectification in a game of what one could call, in a word, the politics of truth” 
(Foucault, 1996:386). It “consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of 
familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted 
practices are based” (Foucault, 2003a:172).
Foucault (2007) furhter developed his ideas around resistance, in relation to the 
processes of governmentality (as opposed to, for instance, revolts against 
economic oppression), through the concept of 'counter-conduct'; this will be 
drawn on extensively in the analysis. Foucault described counter-conduct as “the 
will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price” (ibid:75). 
'Counter-conduct' highlights the intertwining of resistance with the forms of 
governmentality it opposes (Black, 2010). In this way it draws on a key 
Foucauldian insight: that power is relational, rather than something monolithic, 
something that might possessed. Thus, 'counter-conduct' is a “struggle against 
the processes implemented for conducting others” (Foucault, 2007:201), but not a
total rejection of government. Foucault highlights that resistance, as 'counter-
conduct', involves a preoccupation with the proper and preferred way to be 
governed, or “how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those 
principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such 
procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them” (ibid:44). Foucault explored 
'counter-conduct' in relation to historical examples of resistances to early forms of
pastoral Christianity, and suggested that, rather than rejecting its modes of 
government, 'counter-conduct' communities mobilized border-elements, 
marginalized by the early Church (such as asceticism, mysticism, and direct 
engagement with the scripture), to establish new relationships of 'truth' and 
power, and to produce a new governmentality for themselves and others. In 
adopting 'counter-conduct' as a key 'tool' in my analysis I am able to examine 
how the resistance demonstrated by my narrators can be seen to mobilize the 
strategies, techniques and power relationships they oppose.
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This research draws on the above in examining how would-be-patients redefine, 
and renegotiate the 'truth' of their experiences and identities in the face of the 
mental health establishment. Following Foucault, I assume that the formation of 
the subject cannot be separated from the macro discursive context. Taking up a 
Foucauldian critique allows me to link personal experiences, in the shape of 
narrative accounts, to the discursive resources they draw upon, and to the power 
structures in which they are situated.
2.4. Procedure
2.4.1. The sample
I collected narratives online. My primary data mining tool was 'Google' 
(www.google.co.uk), which I complimented by repeating the process on additional
search engines. I used simple keyword searches (e.g., 'psychosis and spirituality';
see Appendix 7.2.) to identify useful websites. I then 'snowballed' this data 
identification by following hyperlinks within these pages. I searched manually 
within this corpus for first-person accounts which met the following criteria:
1.An autobiographical account
2.From the UK
3.In which the author interacts with the psychiatric system, even if only briefly or
tangentially
4.In particular with the 'psychosis' or 'schizophrenia' construct. 
5.And describes understanding their experience as having been wholly or 
partially 'spiritual' or 'mystical' in nature.
Many narratives were identified, the vast majority of which failed to meet these 
criteria. This was largely due to two principle restrictions. Firstly, in identifying 
stories at the nexus of the medical and 'spiritual' discourses, where many 
accounts were rooted in one or the other. This restriction was necessary as it is 
the interaction of these two discourses that is the primary concern of this study. 
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The second principle restriction on the sample was in finding narratives that 
explicitly identified a UK context, as location of author and account was typically 
ambiguous. Given my use of online data I might sensibly have included accounts 
from around the world, as these all contribute to the unique discursive landscape 
online. However, as an employee of the NHS I chose to focus on UK accounts, in 
the hope that my findings can be most easily located within the idiosyncratic NHS
medical context, and may carry most weight here. Moreover the treatment, 
reception and viability of 'spiritual' and 'medical' discourses varies cross-culturally,
and this has implications for the material experiences of the narrators, in selecting
only UK accounts I have attempted to examine cases which shared a similar 
meta-narrative landscape. Thus, this research particularly addresses the 
experience of 'spiritually' transformative experiences in the UK context (although I
acknowledge a great degree of cross-cultural discursive interaction is all but 
inevitable given my use of internet retrieved data).
Just three accounts were identified which fully satisfied these criteria. I will 
introduce each of these briefly now, and these details will be thickened as each 
narrative is introduced in the analysis chapter. Note that I am only drawing on 
information available online, and as a result, complete biographies and full 
demographic details are unavailable. Each of the narrators asked to be identified,
and their works referenced.
2.4.1.1. Sarah
Sarah describes a long career as a psychiatric nurse working with “regressive 
psychosis” in the UK prior to her “transformative” PLE, which she eventually 
comes to understand, through a 'spiritual' lens, as a “Kundalini Awakening”. 
Sarah actively avoids contact with the psychiatric system immediately following 
her PLE, and may never have come to interact as a 'patient' within the psychiatric
system. However, some years after her experience she elected to give a speech 
to the Spirituality Special Interest Group of the Royal College of Psychiatry. I 
considered that this speech itself represented an interaction of the medical 
discourses, and for this reason was considered to meet the selection criteria. This
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speech is the only text available from Sarah, and is used in full in the analysis.
2.4.1.2. Spoon
Spoon is 40-year-old Scottish man, he has an MSc in Computer Science, works 
as a programmer, and has a wife and child. His PLE occurred over several 
months in 2007, one year after his wedding, although he only came to write the 
narrative selected in 2009. Throughout the episode he draws on science-fiction 
metaphors to story his experience, although he also makes use of 'spiritual' and 
'enlightenment' constructs, and considers himself transformed by his PLE. Spoon 
sought to avoid medical interference, however he finally, involuntarily, spent a 
whole week on a psychiatric ward. The narrative selected was found on his 
personal website, amongst a collection of other writings; this text was selected 
amongst others because Spoon identifies it as the most complete description of 
the events surrounding his PLE.
2.4.1.3. Philip
Philip is a self-confessed “composer, writer, nature photographer/recordist, and 
promoter of self actualisation”. He describes a long history of involvement with 
'spiritual' and 'esoteric' traditions and practices, and considers himself to have 
become 'enlightened', or, as he prefers, to have attained “fundamental clarity” in 
1997. He now rejects all notions of 'spirituality' as flawed or misleading, but 
continues to promote his own 'reality' challenging notions of “clear mindedness”. 
He has experienced four hospitalisations resulting from PLE since 2004, which 
amongst other things, have given him insight into the operations of a universally 
malignant force, “the garbage”. He describes being transformed by these 
experiences, and by his own personal development work, or “inner inquiry”. Philip
has produced a very large volume of works which might be considered relevant to
this research, the narrative selected is his fullest account of his first experience 
with psychiatry, as it is here that he treats the subject in most detail, and here that
we can witness most clearly how his 'spiritual' (for want of a better word) 
understandings help him to make sense of his experience of the medical model.
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2.4.1.4. Sample   s ize
Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that the success of a study is not dependent 
upon sample size, a position that contrasts with positivist approaches, which 
require large samples to achieve approximations of ‘generalisability’ and 'validity'.
The main determinant of sample size should be the research question. A case-
study approach is justifiable here, where my aim is to understand how 'spiritual' 
and 'mystical' narratives operate in relation to psychiatric discourse and PLE.
To this end, I completed a detailed analysis of each narrative. In doing so I was 
able to preserve and present some of their original structure; and to avoid “getting
bogged down in too much data” (Potter & Wetherall, 1987:161). 
Following McCarthy and Rapley (2001:159), I work on the premise that the 
narrative operations I identify in these accounts can logically be anticipated to 
speak to common features of our culture:
“Cultures are such that their features can’t simply be aggregated or 
counted. Instead, even very small fragments of them […], must (as 
with holograms) display the order inherent in the whole.”
2.4.1.5. Naturalistic   d ata
I am employing publicly available data, an example of “naturally occurring talk”, 
which may be more appropriate for qualitative analysis than interview transcripts 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005). An advantage of this approach is in minimizing 
researcher influence on the data collected. This might be contrasted with more 
commonly employed interview data, which is a co-construction between 
participant and researcher.
2.4.1.6. Online data
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Data retrieved from the internet might be criticised as potentially unreliable, and 
as such, unsuitable for analysis, or less relevant than interview data. My counter 
to this is two-fold. First, unproblematically assuming 'truthfulness' from either 
interview, or internet-retrieved, data would be an error. Second, the utility and 
ubiquity of online information in our society is such that we must take these 
discursive resources seriously. Online accounts form part of a “vast informational 
flow” which serves to organise biographies in late modernity (Jones, 2005:293). 
Individuals experiencing PLE, or positioned as 'mentally ill', may turn to the 
internet for accessible information. This has significant implications for how they 
will come to understand their experience. Online information is treated as credible
by the 'lay' community; and is increasingly being used to challenge the traditional 
doctor-patient relationship (Higgins et al., 2011). Moreover, new subject positions 
have become possible; many who experience PLE share this online, and seek 
validation from supportive niche communities made possible by the vast numbers
of people connected to the network. 
2.4.2. Reading the narratives
Ricouer (1981:174) compares reading a text to “the performance of a musical 
piece”. Freed from direct interaction with the narrator, the reader takes on a 
powerful and final interpretive role. Therefore, I aimed to engage with the text in 
as transparent a manner as possible. To do so I adopted Gee's (1991) poetic 
stanza approach, which requires the analyst to segment the original text into 
theorised component parts. From base components, or 'idea units', (separated 
from each other by a forward slash, “/”), through lines (each made up of a single 
“topic” or “argument”) and stanzas (groups of lines making up a vignette, a 
particular description of a character, action, or claim). Sets of stanzas addressing 
the same broad topic constitute strophes; and grouped strophes make up the 
parts. Working on texts already formatted by the authors occasionally required 
me to modify this approach so that I privileged their editorial decisions, for 
instance, over what constituted a 'part'.
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I will not claim that meaning 'exists' in the structure of the text; but argue that the 
creative process of analysis is facilitated by a consideration of structure. Gee 
(1991:15) argued that narrative research had “greatly undersold how much 
meaning is, in fact, available in the structure of the language of a text”, and 
offered his method as a remedy. This method facilitated a consideration of the 
function and operations of parts of the text beyond the level of word or sentence, 
and beneath the level of the text as a whole. It also allowed me to demonstrate 
some aspects of my reading of the text, so that my readers can assess this, and 
consider what they might have read differently. Finally, free from the labour of 
transcription, this method provided an opportunity for a deep engagement with 
the text.
2.4.3. Analytic procedure
The process of reformatting within Gee's framework, like transcription, can be 
considered the first stage of analysis. I followed a further five phases based upon 
Langdridge's CNA (2007). It should be noted that my analysis did not proceed 
through discrete stages, and is better understood as a series of overlapping, 
iterative phases. Throughout the analysis period, and particularly during the 
process of synthesising my findings, each 'phase' of analysis fed back into and 
informed every other 'phase'.
2.4.3.1. Phase   1:   “ A    Critique   of   the   Illusions   of   Subjectivity ”
Langdridge (2007:134) encourages the researcher to turn their 'hermeneutic of 
suspicion' upon themselves, in what is “effectively a moment of reflexive 
engagement”. This I did, focussing my reflections on aspects of my own 
experience which impact upon my reception of the key topics identified as I 
reformatted the narratives, in light of a Foucauldian consideration of power. 
These reflections were presented in the introduction (section 1.2).
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2.4.3.2. Phase   2:    Identifying   narratives,   tone,   and   rhetorical   function
My first reading of the three narratives aimed to identify the 'master narrative', 
and any distinct additional narratives. I paid attention to the emotional tone of the 
text which might reveal information not apparent in the content, in particular I 
attended to changes in perceived tone. I was also interested in the rhetorical 
function of each part of the text. The rhetorical functions of each strophe, and the 
narratives as a whole were considered by asking: “What is this particular story 
doing at this point? And, how?”; and “How are the narrators positioning 
themselves and to what end?”; I primarily drew on Harré's Positioning theory in 
responding to these questions.
2.4.3.3. Phase   3:    Identities   and  i dentity    work
My second reading of the text examined the 'self' that was being brought into 
being. Here narratological theories of self were most relevant. Additionally, I was 
once again drawing on Positioning theory. I attended to the “particular self being 
brought into being” (Langdridge, 2007:138), how these related to the narratives 
invoked by the narrator, how the narrators were positioned by their audience and 
others, and how they chose to position themselves.
2.4.3.4. Phase   4:   T hematic    priorities   and   key   constructs  
In this third reading I sought to identify the major themes in the text without losing
a sense of the narrative being presented. Langdridge states that this aspect of 
the analysis is similar to thematic analysis, but here one aims to identify key 
themes directly, rather than breaking the text apart in order to code meaning. My 
approach to this stage was to identify the key constructs being deployed by the 
narrator (e.g., 'Enlightenment'), and to ask what work these were doing with 
regards to self-narrative, identity work and positioning.
2.4.3.5. Phase   5:   D estabilizing    the   narrative  
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“This stage involves the analyst engaging directly in a political critique of the text” 
(Langdridge, 2007:136). This is potentially controversial, in that it goes beyond 
the text; but also, potentially, illuminating. Central to this move is the recognition 
that we must have “a view from somewhere” (Ricouer, 1996) within ideological 
structures, and formally taking up another position may allow us a perspectival 
shift beyond the apparent. Thus, at this stage I brought a Foucauldian 
“hermeneutic of suspicion” (ibid:139) to bear upon the analysis produced during 
phases 2 to 4. In this context a 'hermeneutic of suspicion' is a critical theory 
deployed as “an alternative way of seeing: not a way that reveals the truth hidden
beneath the surface, but rather a way of taking up an alternative position” 
(ibid:136).
This phase began when I made a concerted effort to expose myself to the works 
and modes of analysis of Michel Foucault. I read his works on the histories of 
madness, disciplinary, and psychiatric power, and was particularly interested in 
his readings of practices of resistance and counter-conduct. I re-read the 
developing analysis and the original texts holding in mind the concepts briefly 
unpacked earlier (section 2.4.2.2). The claim here is not to have uncovered some
hidden 'truth' within the narratives, but rather to offer an alternative perspective.
2.5. Ethics
Each of the narratives exists in the public domain, and the authors were not 
involved in the study as 'participants'. As such, ethical approval was not sought 
from the NHS or any other committee. To respect the authors ownership of the 
narratives, and ensure compliance with copyright law, I obtained consent from 
each author and the 'Webmaster' of each website (Appendix 7.4). With regards to
confidentiality and anonymity, each author requested that they be identified as 
the creator of the account, and the address of the websites made public, this 
information is presented in the analysis as each narrative is introduced.
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2.6. Evaluative Criteria
In evaluating this study I followed Yardley (2000:215), who proposes attending to 
the following issues: “sensitivity to context; commitment and rigour; transparency 
and coherence; impact and importance”. These criteria will be revisited in the 
discussion.
2.7. Presentation of the Analysis
The analysis is presented in two parts. In the first part I present each of the three 
narratives. Seeking to retain their integrity, I have preserved each narrative's 
structure, and sought to integrate the results of phases 2 to 4 of the analysis into 
this retelling. I introduced themes, constructs, and performative movements as 
exemplars appear within the narratives. Each narrative is made to speak to the 
others as common themes and divergences are highlighted. 
In the second part my Foucauldian 'hermeneutic of suspicion' functions as a 
second-order analysis of the initial analysis, and also as an initial discussion.
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3. ANALYSIS
3.1. Sarah's 'Kundalini Awakening'
Bakhtin (1986) insists that all talk is dialogic, even monologue, and must be 
understood within the particular conversational context. Sarah first presented her 
narrative to a meeting of the Spirituality Special Interest Group (SIG) of the Royal
College of Psychiatry in 2007. A written version of the talk was available 
(retrieved January, 2014) on the SIG webpage. Sarah is presenting to a group of 
psychiatrists, her only open interaction with Mental Health (MH) professionals as 
an 'experiencer'. The presumed SIG audience tolerance towards spiritual or 
mystical discourses may have allowed her to say more than she might have done
in a more traditional psychiatric setting.
Sarah titles her talk “A Personal Experience of Kundalini”. A single narrative is 
presented: Sarah is dissatisfied with her life until she begins to experience 
unusual visual and sensory stimulation, with clear religious overtones. These 
initial experiences are so intense that they become difficult to manage. By 
drawing on her own rationality, expertise as a psychiatric nurse, selected 
confidants, and understanding of alternative spiritual and psychological literature, 
she was able to “incorporate” this experience, which she primarily constructs as a
“Kundalini Awakening”, and thereby process negative emotional material. The 
outcome for Sarah is increased compassion, a new and very personal 
relationship with God, and a new way of being.
In her opening line Sarah gives us a neat summary of the 'master narrative' she 
will lay out:
“This talk is my personal account / of a brief psychotic episode / that 
seems to fit with the classical description of a Kundalini spiritual 
awakening.”
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The early tone of the narrative is upbeat, hinting at revelations to come:
 “I would now say that it has improved my life beyond all recognition.”
Later her tone becomes more scholarly or educative, e.g. drawing on academic 
material, before finally rising to a celebratory climax:
“Kundalini is really a beautiful love story”
For the purposes of analysis, I segmented the text into five parts, further 
subdivided these into eleven strophes, which together made up twenty-seven 
stanzas. I will take each part in turn, examining the rhetorical function, positioning
and identity work, and highlighting key themes and constructs within the text.
3.1.1. Part 1: Introduction
In the first strophe Sarah introduces two key constructs: 'Regressive Psychosis' 
and 'Spiritual Awakening'. She tells us the story is about a positive 
transformation, and will be explained in relation to supporting literature. 
“After a long career as a psychiatric nurse, / I felt there was something 
different about my own experience / compared to most regressive 
psychotic states I have witnessed in others, / and instead of leaving 
me ill and damaged / I feel transformed.”
Sarah's rhetorical intent is establishing a 'footing'; claiming the right, both as 
nurse and experiencer, to speak authoritatively about her 'psychosis like 
experience' (PLE). She seeks a position which grants sufficient illocutionary force
to carry the message which follows; and which avoids her being 'malignantly 
62
positioned' (Sabat, 2003). The dialogical nature of the text is demonstrated by the
anticipation of critique, and work to counter it. Sarah is preparing to deliver a 
message which may be difficult to hear.
Sarah describes her own “brief psychotic episode”. Deployed here, the label 
bolsters her credibility, positioning her as an 'expert by experience'. Refusing the 
undifferentiated, objectified position of 'patient', she distinguishes her PLE from 
“regressive psychotic states”; instead her experience “seems to fit with the 
classical description of a kundalini spiritual awakening”, and has been personally 
transformative. This differentiation avoids direct contestation inside the 
psychiatric frame, instead she searches for a vacant position free from pre-
established right and duty assignments (Lee, Lessem & Moghaddam, 2008). She
positions her original audience outside of their area of psychiatric expertise, and 
stakes her claim to be able to speak to them authoritatively. She demonstrates a 
gap in their knowledge, and offers conceptual building blocks to fill it. The 
audience are ascribed the duty to listen.
In the second strophe Sarah sets the scene for her 'awakening'. She dismisses 
the medical narrative, and shifts to a spiritual frame. Sarah's description of her 
“mid-life crisis” serves to demonstrate the coherence of her experience with 
“Assagioli's Psychosynthesis framework”, thereby drawing credibility from an 
academic authority, which itself draws on ancient spiritual traditions.
Sarah positions her prior-to-psychosis-self as undeveloped; retroactively 
reconfiguring this period of her life as a journey towards her transformation. 
Sketching a “desperately unhappy” prior-self demonstrates the extent of her 
transformation later in the narrative. Major events, such as divorce, are treated 
cursorily – where many different tellings were possible, this one denies 
significance to the lived-experience of the prior-self.
“Despite experiencing an outwardly successful life in material terms, / I
was desperately unhappy inside / and I sensed I was not living life in a 
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way that was right for me.”
“Unresolved grief” introduces a third, apparently psychological frame, setting the 
scene for the 'awakening'. The last line of the strophe returns to the medical 
frame, as she works to differentiate her own background from the typical 'patient':
“One major issue was an unresolved grief reaction / I experienced 
when my 27 year old partner died in a plane crash, / when I was 25 
years old.  
As soon as I grieved for him / I experienced my Kundalini awakening.
I was 42 years old / and I was not ill / or taking any medication at the 
time / and I do not have any personal or family history / to explain the 
crisis.”
3.1.2. Part 2: Kundalini awakening
Sarah describes her 'awakening': from the acute phase, which lasted two weeks 
(including one week trekking in Nepal); to finding a crack in her “delusion state”, 
which allowed her to return (albeit permanently altered) to consensus 'reality'; 
then later, learning to manage less extreme but continuous sensations.
Having differentiated herself from a 'Regressive Psychotic', Sarah begins with the
rhetorical intent of establishing 'Kundalini' as credible. Drawing on the 
Transpersonal Psychology literature she details her physical experience of 
'Kundalini':
“The whole thing started with a powerful energy snaking around my 
body / and intense heat coming out of my feet. 
I was wondering if I was becoming physically ill / but I had no clues as 
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to what the heat and energy might be / and I did not feel unwell 
anyway.”
 
Sarah emphasises the purifying qualities of 'Kundalini'. Within this storyline PLE 
is not pathological, but is transformed into a healing of consciousness. Instead, 
everyday consciousness is in need of 'awakening':
“It passes through / every part of the organism / removing blocks / and 
awakening consciousness... / the entire process can be seen as one of
purification... / and may mark the beginning of a process of 
enlightenment.”
Sarah seeks to demonstrate how well-contained she was. Unusual thinking 
characterised her experience, but sharing this problematises her credibility. In 
response she positions herself as a reflexive observer, open to multiple 
interpretations, and led in a empiricist fashion by the information of her own 
senses. Her competence is reinforced as she disavows the more 'delusional' 
aspects of her thinking, not incorporated within the 'Kundalini' storyline. 
Competence is achieved, in part, by demonstrating how her ideas were open to 
review, in part through humour, highlighting the 'absurdity' of her prior-beliefs, and
in part by demonstrating ongoing concern for the self:
“On the second night / I had got it into my head / that it was my time to 
die.
Needless to say, after a good night’s sleep, / I was most surprised 
when I woke up the next day.”
Sarah plays down any 'functional impairment' as a rational response to the 
situation, i.e., by making short-term adjustments to her life, such as choosing not 
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to go to work, she was able to “function as usual”. In fact, rather than suffering, 
Sarah was the fortunate witness of PLE, as something profound:
“I also got the general sense that I was not alone / and started to see a
variety of beautiful colours swirling around my room at night, / as well 
as the most exquisite miniature angels flying around me.”
In Strophe five Sarah presents herself as “overwhelmed” by an experience that 
would meet the psychiatric criteria of a 'delusion':
“Eventually, I felt my crown chakra open / and saw a massive white 
light surround me; / an archangel came to tell me / that I was to have a
union with God, / and give birth to Christ.”
Having previously reported, and repaired, 'delusional' thinking now allows Sarah 
to describe PLE and to be received as a rational speaker: We are expecting a 
repair, and are less likely to dismiss this speech act immediately. Sarah instead 
introduces another theme - communicating PLE. That is, selecting to whom, and 
when, to speak; thereby avoiding the psychiatric gaze: 
“On reflection, perhaps keeping quiet about the whole thing was to my 
advantage / as it meant I was left alone / to go through the psychotic 
process / without any medical intervention of any kind.”
Sarah's description of talking herself down from a 'psychotic' brink, of reality 
checking, and of a considered decision to avoid medical support, demonstrates to
the audience her ongoing connection to 'reality', and control over her conduct. 
She works to demonstrate her familiarity with the medical narrative, effectively 
positioning against the suggestion that her experience might be better 
understood as 'illness'.
66
3.1.3. Part 3: Moving on
Sarah draws again on academic writings to thicken her 'Kundalini' narrative. In 
the first line she forecloses further use for the medical frame, or the psychiatric 
'gaze'; stating that she experienced no “further symptoms”. From herein PLE is 
interpreted within the 'Kundalini' frame. Amongst other things the passage of time
since this episode serves to justify this foreclosure:
“This crisis occurred nearly six years ago now / and I have not 
experienced any further symptoms / or difficulties of any nature / since 
this time.”
She describes having explored the 'Kundalini' literature, and outlines her findings.
Her own experience and this literature become mutually reinforcing as a narrative
structure from the literature is superimposed upon, and thereby re-positions, prior
experience:
“It is clear to me now / that the pattern of my experience / was 
recognisably consistent with my chakras opening up / one by one from
the root to the crown.”  
Sarah's 'Kundalini' is vulnerable to psychiatric interference. Any “negative effects”
become the “result of resistance to purification”. A different response is required, 
which retrospectively justifies having not sought medical attention. Drawing on 
the Transpersonal literature, the psychiatric response to Sarah's PLE is 
positioned as damaging. The communication theme is elaborated; Sarah must 
communicate her experience, and this requires a receptive context:
“I was lucky enough to have a friend to confide in after this episode, 
who was a medium herself and so did not find my story as strange as 
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most others would have done.”
This suggests something about Sarah's local discursive environment; we might 
speculate she has heard similar stories before, and was at least receptive 
enough to these to remain in contact with her “medium” friend (who may well 
have 'heard voices' or 'seen visions' herself). 
It is interesting that she explores the theme of helpful and unhelpful 
communication before revealing her “new found paranormal abilities” – potential 
'symptoms' within the psychiatric frame. Her statement that, due to lack of 
understanding from others, she was made to feel “a freak at times” reverses the 
'gaze' and positions her audience as potential re-enactors of such persecutory 
incidents; instating upon them a supererogatory duty to avoid this.
Sarah also takes up new duties with regards to communicating her experience. 
Those experiencing 'Kundalini', as opposed to 'Regressive Psychosis', are more 
“interested in sharing what is going on in them”. This bolsters the illocutionary 
force of the talk: the act of communicating supports the proposition that the 
experience is 'Kundalini'. 
Reorienting the storyline to focus on failed communication, and denied realities, 
positions Sarah as duty-bound to educate; and the audience as duty-bound to 
attend with open minds.
3.1.4. Part 4: Integrating experience
The rhetorical function shifts, as Sarah seeks to convey the positive experience 
and implications of PLE as 'Kundalini', particularly its universal importance. She 
describes a developing understanding of her PLEs, as newfound “psychic 
abilities”, which connect her to “higher levels of consciousness”. This “expanded 
consciousness” revealed repressed “negative emotions”, and allowed her to 
overcome these, facilitating the development of a new relationship with her 
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“higher self”.
“Although the acute aspect of this crisis happened over a two-week 
period, / I would judge that the whole process continued on for a 
further two and a half years. 
It culminated in my heart chakra opening, / which I now understand / to
be the ultimate purpose behind the Kundalini rising anyway.”
Sarah's 'Kundalini' is one aspect of a “path we are all on to reach the highest 
levels of human spiritual development”. Citing spiritual texts, she claims that the 
level of consciousness she has attained is likely not accessible to those who 
have not had a “dramatic experience” like 'Kundalini'. Despite this, 'Kundalini' is 
universally meaningful. 'Kundalini' constructs PLE, not as 'delusion', but as an 
external stimulus received at a higher level of perception. This 'unreal' experience
is a window into previously unseen 'reality'. In this 'reality' Sarah has privileged 
access to 'truth'.
Sarah introduces her “new found paranormal abilities” in this context; i.e., as at 
least potentially universally accessible. Even so, these are offered tentatively, in a
graded fashion, from sensing spiritual energy in a church, to hearing and seeing 
spirits. These are positive experiences:
“This is a beautiful feature for me / as now just a walk in the park can 
be a very moving experience.”
Through PLE 'Kundalini' has made possible the formation of a new relationship 
with her “higher self”. A developing 'self' does a lot of work in the narrative, 
positioning Sarah as a key agent. Her storied 'self' demonstrates agency in self-
development, in particular when she introduces her recent training in 
“Psychosynthesis Psychotherapy”, which enabled her to process “negative 
69
emotions and mental vibrations” quite unlike the “regressive psychotic”. As 
narrator she demonstrates agency through creativity in combining psychological 
and spiritual discourses in a novel way. This establishes an ongoing duty for 
Sarah, who must work on herself:
“An unintegrated Kundalini / […] would have left me impoverished 
rather than transformed, / I'm sure this would have happened if I hadn't
taken the steps I did to work on my inner life after the event.”
Within her 'Kundalini' narrative Sarah is able to deal with phenomena such as 
“earthbound spirits” as wholly spiritual. She returns briefly to her initial messianic 
PLE and reclaims privileged aspects. Re-storied these become a window through
which Sarah was able to “begin to know what love means”. This retrospective 
revision stresses the meaningfulness of PLE, regardless of how it was 
understood at the time. Sarah describes herself as having been privileged 
enough to temporarily experience herself as Mary, perhaps the closest she will 
ever get to “Human as realised divinity”. In her PLE Sarah finds joy, pride and 
compassion.
3.1.5. Part 5: Transformation
Part five serves as an epilogue. Sarah went on to form a new, and direct, 
relationship with god; and found a supportive 'new age' spiritual community. The 
central message of the story is presented explicitly – 'Kundalini' should be 
understood as “a beautiful love story”, and “integral to all our lives”. Once again 
our ordinary consciousness and 'consensus reality' are positioned as 
impoverished.
After outlining the development of a “much deeper” relationship with her 'self', the
world and other people, Sarah makes a revelation:
“My guardian angel introduced himself to me in July 2006 and I have 
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now had direct communication with Jesus himself. 
From this, I gauge that the subtle level has finally arrived and 
established itself within me.” 
This potential 'symptom' now serves to reinforce Sarah's sense of ongoing 
development of consciousness. 'Evidence' of psychopathology becomes 
'evidence' of achievement of the “subtle level of consciousness”.
Finally, Sarah introduces her new found supportive community, and returns to the
theme of communicating experience:
“I have found it vitally important to have my experiences validated / by 
others who I consider to be sound, trustworthy, in touch with reality 
and with a good track record / or I would have been in danger of 
becoming isolated by my changed reality / and worse still left feeling 
that I was mad. 
The White Eagle Lodge [a global spiritual community] also provided 
meaning about the episode itself, / which helped with the process of 
integration.”
Having a supportive spiritual forum helped Sarah to re-story, or “integrate”, her 
PLE. Her experience is validated by others who have access to her “changed 
reality”. This is a shared 'unreality' that organises the conduct of the community. 
The community offer a counter-reading of her original episode within a spiritual 
frame. Given that she has only had contact with White Eagle Lodge for two years 
when delivering the talk, we might question how stable the spiritual narrative was 
before this time, and whether Sarah had been feeling “mad”.
Overall then, the rhetorical function of the narrative appears consistent – to 
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describe and define a misunderstood spiritual experience, and to argue that this 
fits her 'reality' better than the alternative of 'regressive psychosis'. Sarah 
carefully controls the flow of information that might be considered diagnostically 
significant. Through a process of release and repair she anticipates her 
audience's potential diagnostic inclination, and counteracts this. As she 
establishes a footing this process of repair fades, and her narrative is more 
consistently spiritual. She is able to use evidence from her direct experience, her 
reading of the literature, and her competence as a nurse, to make credible her 
interpretation of this experience as 'Kundalini'. Understood as 'Kundalini' PLE is 
'integrated' into a transformative self-narrative. In doing so, she presents a self 
whose compassion is radically enhanced, and who carries the “Christ child at 
heart centre”.
3.2. Spoon's Enlightenment
Spoon is Scottish, 40-years-old, and married with one child. He studied electrical 
Engineering at University, and has a Masters in Software Engineering. During an 
extended period of travel he “attuned to reiki Level 1”, and later became a “Reiki 
Master” upon his return to Scotland. Spoon's narrative appears on his own 
website (www.iamthespoon.org). The website was created in 2007 to host a 
number of his writings, produced following the “spiritual experience” described 
below. The URL is a reference to a line in the film 'The Matrix', when a young boy
informs Neo that “the truth is that there is no spoon”. In fact, pop-culture 
references, particularly to 'Sci-Fi', are present throughout the text. Spoon deploys
these in the same way as Sarah did academic literature, in creatively interpreting 
experience.
Multiple texts exist on the site. A single narrative has been chosen for analysis 
(retrieved January, 2014), which was uploaded two years after the website was 
registered. We might assume that the text was prepared for publication on the 
website, and with this readership in mind. Titled “Spiritual Psychosis”, the text 
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represents the fullest account of the events leading up to, and following, a week 
long psychiatric hospitalisation. Unlike Sarah, Spoon never presented this 
narrative to a live audience. However, the audience still shapes the text through 
the narrator’s expectations about how the account might be received, and his 
aims in relation to this.
For the purposes of analysis I followed Spoon's segmentation of the text into ten 
parts, and Spoon's titles are retained. These I further subdivided into 16 strophes,
containing 37 stanzas.
3.2.1. “Part 1: Introduction”
The tone of the text shifts distinctly between parts, as positioning and rhetorical 
functions vary. Spoon begins on a reflective note:
“At the time this whole experience seemed like a profound spiritual 
insight to me, / but now seems like an attempt to explain an acid trip / 
by a bloke who's read one too many Sci-Fi novels.”
Two constructs are introduced that will interweave throughout the narrative: 
“spiritual insight” or 'Enlightenment'; and “consensual reality” (which I read as an 
idiosyncratic construction of 'consensus reality'). A figure-ground relationship is 
evident between these two, generally 'Enlightenment' is unfolding on a backdrop 
of 'consensual reality'. Conversely, this opening statement seems to centre the 
'consensual reality' storyline. Demonstrating 'insight' appears to be part of the 
moral order of 'consensual reality'. The social force of the speech act above is to 
demonstrate insight as to a possible sceptical 'consensual' reception of the 
narrative that follows. Spoon pre-positions himself as aligned with this sceptical 
worldview, as one engaged in critical reflection. In sharing his story he is seeking 
“integration and closure”. 
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3.2.2. “Part 2: Energy Overload”
Spoon describes the impact of attending a course whilst jet-lagged, opening up to
pure joy, and coming to believe he is 'Enlightened':
“The door opened for me in April [2007] / at the age of 33 / when I was 
on a personal development course in London / and had the insight that
various situations that I blamed other people for, / I actually caused to 
happen myself.”
The door opening marks a biographical disruption, and the beginning of an 
'Enlightenment' experience. The prior-self is positioned as flawed - broken by 
“Dad, School and Society” - and in need of transformation. These experiences 
are presented within the 'Enlightenment' frame. From this position, the events 
that follow take on a purposeful quality – the unfolding of a healing process. 
Spoon is as an active agent; it is his 'insight' which opens the door.
While the tone at the outset is sombre, it rises to near ecstatic by the end of the 
part as Spoon presents a story-self in transformation; experiencing pure joy as a 
catalyst, which initiates his “Enlightenment” process. The Spoon shared this 
experience with the group, saying:
"I am Joy.
I am Love. 
Whatever I do, is meaningless. 
Whatever I do not do is meaningless. […] 
I am Joy. 
I could leave now... 
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but I'm feeling a bit shaky."
This drew the attention of the course facilitators, who privately asked him to 
leave.
“I said that I'd been meditating for 15 years / and hadn't gained as 
much as I had in those few days of the course.”
By positioning himself as an experienced meditator Spoon increases the 
illocutionary force of the ecstatic experiences he has already described, 
increasing his credibility as arbiter of his own 'Enlightenment':
“As this point, I was fully convinced that I'd become Enlightened / and 
was somewhat concerned about how I was going to support my family,
/ not being at all sure that I was going to be able to hold down a job.”
Spoon's 'Enlightenment' construct operates upon his PLE, and thus upon the self. 
Here 'Enlightenment' functions as a discrete stage or achievement: The ecstatic 
experiences described are part of (and potentially prerequisite for), the path to 
'Enlightenment', but are not the same as 'Enlightenment'. Being 'Enlightened' 
entails a transformation of duties and rights; the new self should not operate in 
the same way as the old one. For instance, Spoon describes saying something 
which “weeks later I regretted / as it showed that my ego was very much still in 
attendance”. “Enlightenment” requires Spoon to conduct his own conduct, in 
order to seek dissolution of his ego. Further, it compels him to review his actions, 
thoughts, and feelings. There is a splitting function at the level of the self, parts of
the former self are being labelled 'ego', and should be transcended – this 
facilitates the disavowing of undesired aspects of the self. The ultimate duties of 
an 'Enlightened' self are suggested later, in Spoon's treatment of homeless 
people: 
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“I wondered if they too had released all attachment and, / with no need
for attainment, / pride, / or desire, sat homeless” 
Perhaps the key operation of 'Enlightenment', like 'Kundalini', is in establishing a 
hierarchy of 'realities'. A single experience can be legitimately within both 
'realities', thereby generating separate subjectivities. Spoon narrates not one, but 
two coexistent selves, which can be tactically deployed. The 'Enlightenment'-self 
is positioned as 'esoteric', outside of, and implicitly above, the mundane self, 
which should be disavowed:
“Conversations [with the course leader] took on a strange dualistic 
quality / in that on one hand they were ordinary mundane 
conversations that one person would have with another, / and yet at 
the same time they took on a dual layer of esoteric meaning / as one 
Enlightened being communicates with another Enlightened being.”
3.2.3. “Part 3: All beings are enlightened”
Homeward-bound, Spoon becomes disorientated; the majority of the text is given 
over to description of his subjective experience:
“I walked down the street towards the train station / and laughed out 
loud as I heard a voice in my head say "Welcome". 
Three people - my wife, / my reiki master / and a friend from university 
- / spoke to me in turn, / congratulating me on my achievement / and 
welcoming me into a group of enlightened minds.”
The utility of the 'Enlightenment' narrative, and its construction of PLE, are 
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evident. Like Sarah, Spoon's potential 'symptoms' ('auditory hallucinations') are 
transformed into profound experience, which confers access to higher levels of 
reality, and a window onto 'truth'. The voices are confirmation of his 
transformation, rather than a diagnostic marker. Inhabiting the 'Enlightenment' 
storyline Spoon is able to respond joyfully. However, 'hearing voices' 
transgresses the moral order of his 'consensual' storyline, which serves as the 
background for the unfolding of 'Enlightenment' experience:
“However I also realised that there must be many Enlightened people 
in the world, / and that in order to live their lives, they behave 
completely normally / and don't talk about the experience. 
So it was with some dismay / that I put away my thoughts of 
international stardom / and stopped laughing out loud.”
Spoon's 'consensual' moral order is revealed – “in order to live [our] lives” we 
have a duty is to “behave completely normally”. This includes a compulsion not to
speak about PLE, which serves to avoid direct contestation between opposing 
discourses. Within the 'Enlightenment' storyline this silence is necessitated by the
inability of the 'unenlightened' receiver to comprehend. Again any communication 
breakdown, is externalised - located within the 'unenlightened'.
“I experienced a great web of beings awakening to their true natures, / 
passing the experience on to another / and then falling back into sleep,
/ into normal existence.”
This final line summarises the rhetorical function of this part. “Enlightenment” 
experiences are universal, but generally fleeting. “Normal” and “sleep” are 
synonymous; those operating only within “normal existence” are viewed as 
potential but inactive participants in a more meaningful interaction. 
“Enlightenment” renders PLE universal, reversing the profound disconnection of 
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madness. A hierarchy of 'realities' is evident once more. Spoon is closer to 'truth' 
than those limited to 'consensual reality'.
3.2.4. “Part 4: Death”
Spoon describes how, exhausted and disoriented, he lay down to sleep/die inside
the station:
“I watched myself / as I walked around and around a pillar, / wondering
if my body would keep doing that until I died of hunger, / or if someone 
would stop me.”
Two aspects of self are presented, actor and observer. The observer-self exists in
the story present, not as a device of retrospective reflection. The observer-self 
distances Spoon from the outwardly irrational actor-self. Self and action are 
separated. Thus the act of circling comes to represent exploration, not madness. 
'Enlightenment', which distinguishes 'awareness' and 'higher self' from more 
mundane behaviour, and unpleasant ego, allows one to be rationally and 
competently aware of one's body acting irrationally – in this way 'mad' action is 
made unproblematic (or at least understandable).
Remembering advice from the course leader that "Sleep is good", Spoon lays 
down to rest by the pillar:
“My breathing slowed, / and I felt my heart stop, / my body crumbled 
into dust / which was blown away by the wind. 
After a short time / I opened my eyes, / and was able to continue my 
journey.”
We can read this as a metaphorical death within the 'consensual' storyline; 
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however, the experience becomes meaningful as 'reincarnation' within the 
'Enlightenment' frame. An appreciation of tone is important; the narrator is serene
in the face of death. The supposed existence of a community of “enlightened 
beings”, who have made this journey before, eases the acceptance of PLE which 
might elicit fear within the 'consensual' narrative. Again meaning is invested into 
anomalous experience as 'Enlightenment' facilitates the integration of PLE as 
part of a transformative journey. 
3.2.5. “Part 5: The Underworld”
Spoon enters the London Underground and experiences it as the “Underworld” - 
the mythical land of the dead. Here the tone is more chaotic, as he struggles to 
integrate his experience.
“The pendulum swung back again, / or rather, / what remained of my 
ego / was putting a judgement interpretation / on my experience / and 
decided it liked what was going on.”
Pendulums swing, circles rotate; a process is in motion, transforming the self, 
impacting directly on the “ego”. What remains of the ego are those parts which 
will not to be disavowed. Spoon himself is not disappearing; disavowing elements
of the prior-self enables the generation of a new subjectivity.
“The pendulum swung back again / and I realised that I was going to 
experience / burning to death in one of the railway tunnels... 
Again the moment passed / and I realised that however intensely good
the highs / and however terrifying the lows, / I'd never be asked to 
experience more than I was capable of withstanding.”
Within this frame all experience of PLE is meaningful, and enjoyment is de-
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centred. Above, Spoon seems to understand his experience in relation to a 
benevolent 'other' who is 'asking' him to continue and assuring his safety. The 
'Enlightenment' narrative governs Spoon's conduct as he takes up a duty to 
answer the request, in order to be transformed. 
Particularly here, in his description of the Underworld, Spoon draws on science-
fiction narratives. Doing so connects his account to discourses comprehensible 
within 'consensual reality'. He draws on the relativist philosophy implicit in much 
science-fiction to problematise the 'consensual' understanding of 'normal' 
experience, e.g., when he quotes from The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy:
“we will soon be restoring normality, / just as soon as we are sure what
is normal, / anyway.”
As time passes underground Spoon's experiences become increasingly celestial:
“One Self, / one soul, / experiencing everything that anyone has / or 
will every [sic] experience. 
So then at that instant / I realised how I am God, / we're all God, / 
living out these different experiences / one after the other in 
progression.”
This self is infinite. Not only every experience Spoon has had, but everything 
experienced in any time or place, is integrated into his Pantheist 'Enlightenment' 
narrative. Like Sarah, Spoon's prior-self is submitted to a universalising 'higher' 
self. There is profound utility in realising that he is “God”, and connecting to this 
ultimate authority – again PLE provides access to 'truth'.
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3.2.6. “Part 6: Rebirth”
Driven by an urge to urinate, Spoon makes his way to the surface. In doing so, he
leaves the more celestial aspects of his new self underground:
“I jumped up and reality seemed to split. 
In one reality, / I took flight and sped off down the tunnel. 
In another reality, / I came back to the ground with a thump / - still very 
much on this plane of existence.”
Multiple 'realities' allows both biographies to continue undisrupted. Two storylines
are juxtaposed in one moment. Both are 'real' in this telling, both happened. The 
dynamic nature of the relationships between alternate 'realities' and selves is 
elaborated three stanzas later. Again two selves are present simultaneously, one 
rooted in 'consensual reality', the other in 'Enlightenment'. Action driven by the 
biological imperative of urination entails stepping back from 'Enlightenment'. This 
enables a reconnection with 'consensual reality', at the cost of diminishment of 
the self:
“As my two selves split further apart, / my experience of myself in 
consensual reality / because [sic] more vivid and present, / speeding 
up to match the movement of people around me, / while my other self,
/ the Enlightened me that had chosen to leave, / slowed down, / 
thoughts coming less frequently, / quieter and more distant, / slowing 
into infinity. 
Allowing me to remain here / by becoming less.”
81
3.2.7. “Part 7: Life After Death”
“I felt like, / to an extent, / I'd failed.” 
Within the 'Enlightenment' storyline a return to 'normality' is a failure, an unfulfilled
duty to be transformed. 'Enlightenment' as a construct is not discredited, but 
further work on the self is necessary.
Spoon positions against possible 'consensual reality' interpretations of his 
experience:
“It was interesting that throughout my experience / I didn't hallucinate 
anything, / it was all a question of my brain / putting a different 
interpretation on my experience.”
Once again the notion of layers of 'reality' is deployed. PLE is situated in an 
arena of multiple viable interpretations. Spoon, as self-observer is beyond the 
psychiatric gaze, he claims the authority to interpret his experience.
“The thing about psychosis / is that it is absolutely real / to the person 
experiencing it, / at no time did I consider that I was having delusions / 
and should present myself to someone in authority / and ask for help.”
This is the first time 'psychosis' is deployed, and understandably significant 
positioning is apparent. Spoon positions himself as knowledgable about the moral
order of 'consensual reality' in relation to PLE, but insist on the 'reality' of his 
direct experience. So doing, he rejects the compulsion to present to the 'authority'
(implicitly referring services back to their disciplinary role).
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3.2.8. “Part 8: Back Down the Rabbit Hole”
Spoon recognises that he still has “character flaws” and further self-
transformation is required. He deploys the practices of thinking and writing about 
his experience to achieve this, thereby taking up the duties of his new moral 
order:
“The two months following this first experience / where [sic] spent 
feverishly thinking / and writing […] 
I took a number of long walks / with some very long trains of thought / -
attempting to start everything / from first principles.”
The duty appears not so much to know one's self, but to re-position one's self 
through a onerous transformation of knowledge. Prior knowledge based on 
'consensual reality' is spoilt. Taking up Spoon's 'Enlightenment' storyline entails 
an imperative to reinterpret everything from “first principles”. The self is 
transformed by reworking the world around it.
“I had the insight / that there wasn't really any part of my mind that I 
could call "Me", / it was all just process. 
But I think / this insight was very much intellectual in nature, / I 
understood that there was "no-self" - / or thought I did, / but there 
wasn't an experience of no self.”
Changes in intellectual understandings are insufficient, ultimate authority has 
been located at the level of “experience” and self-transformation can only be 
achieved there. Eventually his practices are successful in as much as Spoon is 
“tipped […] back into unreality”, which paradoxically enabled a “fuller experience 
of reality”. He experienced himself as “artificial intelligence”, as growing “bigger 
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and bigger”, and as having “Alzheimer's”. Again PLE provides a window to 
'realities' inaccessible to his prior-self:
“I felt as if I was slipping between realities / where any array of 
possibilities might be played out.”
Spoon's wife and mother became concerned about his behaviour. These 
interactions are treated as second hand accounts, as once again actor and 
observer are separated, e.g.,“"John isn't here", / I apparently told her”. This same 
abstraction is amplified in relation to his 'interaction' with MH services, which are 
barely mentioned, and positioned as almost impossibly removed:
“Some local medical service / delivered two anonymous pills through 
the door / - tranquillisers.”
3.2.9. “Part 9: Hospital Bound”
“I was taken to hospital / in a police car / by a couple of officers / who 
clearly thought that psychosis and psychopathy were synonyms / and 
were looking forward to giving me a good kick-in / if I exhibited any 
anomalous behaviour.”
Spoon elaborates on the moral order of 'consensual reality' – particularly on a 
normalising gaze which compels him to hide “anomalous behaviour”. Although 
this tactical silencing suggests competence, he also describes being lost in 
'unreality' at this time. Perhaps reflecting this, he describes little from his week on
the ward. Staff are positioned as distant disciplinarians. This description of 
psychiatric force firmly positions Spoon as a 'survivor':
“I found myself pinned down to the bed / by four orderlies / with my 
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trousers around my knees / and a hypodermic needle in my arse.”
The only reference to other 'patients' positions them as active co-conspirators, 
potentially conscious at the 'Enlightenment' level of 'reality'. They spent time 
together “making endless cups of tea, / [and] speaking in conspiratorial tones”.
Spoon describes being “finally allowed out”, but no further follow up or treatment. 
An extremely limited engagement with psychiatric 'realities' seems to function to 
protect his 'Enlightenment' 'reality' from medical scrutiny.
3.2.10.  “Part 10: Consensual Reality”
“So now it's been exactly two years / since that initial Enlightenment 
experience. 
I feel like I've been able to integrate it somewhat.”
Integration of Spoon’s PLE into a meaningful narrative is an obligation, as it was 
for Sarah. For Spoon, 'Enlightenment' is now a concrete step towards 
transformation. While he does not explicitly claim that he is 'Enlightened', 
elsewhere on the site he makes it clear that he considers himself radically altered
by these experiences.
Spoon leaves open an ambiguity which seems central to the operation of the 
spiritual narrative in relation to 'consensual reality':
“...any experience will leave the experiencer with the choice / as to 
what they take from that experience. 
Is it spiritually significant, / or is it all just being generated by my 
subconscious / in a psychotic interlude? 
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I hope the answer is that it's both.”
3.3. Philip's 'Garbage'
Philip describes a childhood filled with night horrors and inner suffering. As an 
adult he became involved with various spiritual and 'new age' traditions. He 
“crossed the threshold of Enlightenment”, or as he now prefers, gained 
“fundamental clarity” in 1997. Isolated, and troubled by aggressive PLE, he was 
“incarcerated” in psychiatric hospitals twice in 2004, and found more benefit from 
two further hospitalisation in 2006. He describes functioning perfectly since this 
time, and defends stringently against the idea that he is, or has been, 'mentally 
ill'. He now also rejects 'spirituality' itself, offering his own “clear mindedness” as a
mystical replacement. Philips website (www.clarityofbeing.org) advocates his own
brand of “Self-Actualization”, and offers a vast collection of his writings. The 
narrative selected (retrieved January, 2014) relates to his first hospitalisation.
This narrative differs from the previous two in that it is frequently updated, and 
constantly evolving. Throughout the text Philip inserts footnotes and revisions, 
which demonstrate an active process of re-storying. A great deal of 'identity work'
is done through multiple re-tellings so that the final 'self' presented by the 
narrative is not the 'self' as character in the storyline, but the 'self' as reflective 
narrator.
This long text has been divided into four parts, made up on 65 strophes, 
stretching the limits of Gee's (1991) framework.
3.3.1. “Part 1: What Led Up To This?”
“In the beginning of 2004 / the attacks started with a vengeance, / and 
that was a desperately trying time for me […]. 
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The attacking and tormenting 'entities', / which I had no idea at that 
time / were actually just illusory phenomena / caused by the garbage, /
were pretty consistently my only 'company'.
My 'guidance' / (really the garbage, / though I did not realize that at the
time) / was getting more and more pushy […].”
The rhetorical function of this part is to introduce a construct Philip calls “the 
garbage”, and to use this to reframe experiences he previously understood as 
“spiritual”. The text represents the active re-working of self-narrative, from a 
disavowed “spiritual” understanding, in which Philip was channelling “guidance” 
from his “higher self”, to a self for which this same PLE is attributed to “garbage 
interference”. Each reference to “the garbage” links through to the site glossary, 
which explains that this is his preferred term for an external “Dark force”: 
“A troublesome non-physical influence / that interferes, directly or 
indirectly, / with every single person”.
This is elaborated later, within the text, when Philip steps back from attributing 
consciousness to “the garbage”:
 “[…] if you can really talk / of a quasi-autonomous / complex of rogue 
programming / in thought energy / (a bit akin to a computer virus) / 
having an intent or plan […].”
Philip describes how “channelling” messages from what he then understood to be
“higher non-physical beings” in 2003, opened him up to an “apparently long-set-
up 'campaign' by the garbage” with the aim of weakening his “subtle or non-
physical aspects sufficiently for it to be able to take [him] over and make [him] 
one of its puppets”.
Philip describes how “the garbage” deployed “serious and reckless trickery”:
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“the emphasis was on giving me lots of convoluted 'story' / […] / 
including alleged / (but actually fictitious) / past lives of mine / and a 
purported major destiny of mine / for the whole human race”
Buying into this storyline led to:
“disruption of my life / and also causing friends / and acquaintances / 
to start to back off / and see me as 'getting a bit loopy'.”
Philip (like Sarah and Spoon) positions his prior-self as in need of transformation:
Whilst he understood his PLE as 'spiritual' he was being misled by 'the garbage', 
although he was continually struggling to make sense of PLE. He is 'Enlightened' 
and, therefore, open to experience, but detached from it. This open-minded 
stance is central to the selves Philip and Spoon deploy – positioning themselves 
in proximity to a 'truth' that can only remain a mystery; there will be no final 
answers, only right modes of inquiry. Claiming that the garbage took advantage 
of his temporarily “weakly grounded” state he presents a prior-self that was 
rational, but overwhelmed by largely situational factors (e.g., isolation):
“This did not represent / some stupid belief / that I had taken on, / but 
was simply the best assumption / that I could make at that time / on 
the basis of available evidence. 
I still actually had an open mind about everything / - but it would have 
been plain stupid of me / to be so 'open minded' / that I simply did not 
engage at all / with my very real experiences / and operate on the 
basis of the best working assumptions / that I could in the 
circumstances.” 
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This positioning allows him to disavow prior-beliefs, and to defend his 
fundamental rationality – he was misled by “illusory phenomena”, which are 
storied into the 'garbage' narrative as external to the self, and ultimately to be 
overcome. 
It is through his articulation of a 'self as narrator' that we learn how Philip 
currently conceptualises his experience, and constitutes himself as a subject. By 
reinterpreting his PLE in light of a developing “working model” (i.e., chiefly caused
by 'the garbage'), he is able to re-story and re-position himself. His transformed 
self has a special relationship with 'the garbage': he was targeted by it from an 
early age; has seen its workings; and thus is no longer as susceptible as others. 
Throughout the text, we learn that ‘the garbage’ operates between “What is” 
(roughly 'reality') and perception. Direct experience can no longer be trusted, and 
must be subjected to truth-testing through regimented self-exploration (“inner 
inquiry”). Philip is compelled to review and re-story his experience, or else be 
misled. As self-actualized-narrator, Philip claims authority over 'truth'.
'The garbage' is metaphorical, the clearest description of an unknowable force, 
which Philip is attempting to describe in his 'Working Model'. Its metaphorical 
nature does not limit its efficacy. Drawing on the construct Philip is able to re-
story what, through a psychiatric lens, may have been read as 'grandiose 
delusional beliefs', as not only external to the self, and 'real', but also meaningful 
in facilitating a deeper understanding of 'reality'. Although in this story PLE is not 
straightforwardly meaningful (as it was for Sarah and Spoon), it can be rendered 
meaningful through 'inner inquiry', allowing Philip a unique insight into the 
operations of 'What Is'. This leaves Philip in a position to benefit mankind, upon 
whom 'the garbage' still operates. 
Like 'Kundalini', and 'Enlightenment', 'the garbage' is a universal force. Lack of 
insight into its operations leaves us susceptible, hence Philip positions his 
audience as probably under the influence of 'the garbage'; undermining the 
authority of our experience, and the credibility of traditional authorities (scientific 
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and religious), which are likewise corrupted. Philip can determine what is valid in 
others' experience, while they themselves have no way of making this distinction 
(without following his program of “self-actualisation”).
Following five sleepless nights, Philip came to believe he was cursed, would die 
as his guts liquefied, and fall into a “succession of hells”. This was sufficiently 
frightening that he sought help from a “healer” acquaintance, his neighbour and 
“two women” at a church – this communication was controlled: 
“I deliberately used language / that would mean something to them.”
His neighbour, “a bit worried”, contacted NHS Direct. As a result “two very nice 
policemen called at [his] door”, and Philip, happy not to die alone in his flat, 
allowed himself to be escorted to hospital. It is only once he was transferred from 
A&E to the Psychiatric Unit that Philip became alarmed: 
"NO! Not there!" I exclaimed at once / - a bit shocked, actually, / 
because it had not crossed my mind that what was happening to me / 
would get interpreted as a psychiatric issue / - 'mental illness', of all 
things!”
3.3.2 “Part 2: Enter My Prison”
Philip describes his first days on the ward. The rhetorical function seems to be to 
demonstrate the rationality of his current 'garbage' narrative. 
At first, his storyline self, still convinced of the “curse”, finds relief in having found 
a venue for “a peaceful death”. He then experiences a terrifying descent into hell, 
followed by troubling ideas about having been replaced in the outside world by a 
doppelgänger. Ongoing development of the 'self-as-narrator' through re-storying 
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is evident: from a 'spiritual' telling, to one rooted in 'the garbage'. 'The garbage' 
storyline incorporates all PLEs, in fact, all experience. 'Spiritual' experience is 
'real', but implanted by a malignant force. Being 'real' the experience is retained 
as meaningful for the self, if not beneficial. It is by facilitating the transformation of
'truth' (i.e., by revealing the operations of 'the garbage'), that PLE contributes to 
the transformation of self: 
“As I well understand in retrospect / from my much greater clarity 
now, / some years later, / what was really going on was that, / with me 
still having a fair degree of ungroundedness of a particular part of my 
awareness at that time, / the garbage was constantly / and mostly 
covertly / feeding into my mindspace 'pseudo-thought' messages”
The susceptibility of the prior-self to such covert interference might represent a 
threat to identity, and to Philip's credibility as narrator. Repositioning himself as 
strong enough to defy 'the garbage' addresses this:
“I think actually the garbage / was failing quite magnificently in that 
trick, / because I am sure its real aim was to get [the belief that I would
die] established sufficiently deeply in my system / that it would […] 
potentially fatally, / bring about a sort of 'subtle energy' feedback loop 
of self destruction / though believing that I actually was then rapidly 
disintegrating […].
Yet in practice, my consistent open-mindedness / and also my 
consistency in progressively grounding my awareness / while I was 
there in the hospital, / prevented any such thing from happening.”
On his first morning on the ward Philip felt well enough to return home, but found 
his status as a voluntary 'patient' in question:
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“I was kept in / - and my following my 'guidance' / to seek to escape / 
just led to my being stopped each time / and clearly being regarded as 
some sort of unstable miscreant”
Repeated attempts to escape the ward led to Philip being “hustled off to the so-
called Extra Care Area, where difficult characters […] could be restrained as 
necessary”. The following night, still in “seclusion” Philip received “directions from
his guidance” to allow himself to be teleported out of the hospital:
“However, several apparent attempts failed to work / and I was 
directed / to put up a big show of agitation / to get out, / so that I would 
be sedated, / and then, when I was sedated, / it would all work.
So, having some degree of acting ability […] / I acted my part / and 
duly got sedated / by the ward doctor.”
Philip's act of “agitation” is purposive within ‘the spiritual/garbage’ storyline, but is 
received, as intended, within the psychiatric frame as sign of 'pathology'. As a 
result Philip is sectioned:
“However, just being myself / and visibly well / was one thing, / but I 
had already set the machinery of the Establishment in motion.
When I came out of the isolation room / and met my guards (nurses) / I
had a piece of paper given to me / explaining that I was now put under 
the provisions / of the infamous Section 2”
The MH system as “Establishment” is positioned as inflexible, misguided and 
oblivious to the fact that Philip is “visibly well”. Within 'the garbage' storyline 
nurses are essentially supportive, but blind to the true nature of 'reality'. He 
attributes their supportiveness to his own natural openness and friendliness, 
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which had won them over. Where nurses did not comply with this friendly 
expectation, they were being “constrained by a rotten system”. 
His positioning with regards to the ward psychiatrist is complex. At the time he 
believed him to be an “angel incarnation”, rejecting this 'spiritual' understanding 
later, he reworks this into 'the garbage' storyline, reversing the diagnostic gaze:
“Basically, / according to my more recently developed working model, /
he would have been either a no-soul incarnation / (as I am) / […] thus 
potentially would have had unusually deep awareness.
My much more recent inner inquiry results / are suggestive that what 
was causing him to have such a lack of awareness / superficially / was
a spirit attachment […] / used as a means for the garbage to control 
him.
Without a doubt, / if he had not had that 'entity' issue, / he would never 
have had anything to do with psychiatry.”
3.3.3. “Part 3: The Patients”
The rhetorical function here appears to be to discredit “misguided psychiatry”, 
and to offer in its place his own method for “clearing emotional issues”. In the first
strophes of this part Philip develops a description of the 'patients' en masse. Pre-
positioning himself for this task by taking up another label:
“As far as I was concerned, / I myself was not a patient / but simply a 
prisoner.” 
In differentiating 'patient' from 'prisoner', Philip distinguishes himself from the 
'patient' body. He used the term 'prisoner' on the ward, which led to people 
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feeling uncomfortable:
“Not that I wanted to create disharmony as such, / but in this place to 
speak your truth / meant inevitably a certain degree of 'rocking the 
boat'.
If other people had previously been prepared to risk 'rocking the boat' /
in order to speak their truth / I need not have been in this situation in 
the hospital now.”
Within 'the garbage' storyline the act of rejecting the 'patient' label is invested with
significance; it becomes part of a larger resistance against an oppressive system,
which unwittingly facilitates the operations of 'the garbage'. Philip is a lone 
maverick, standing up for 'truth'.
Under the influence of psychiatry the 'patients' believed “there was little about 
them / that was even worth their lifting their heads about”. Philip juxtaposes this 
with his own stance, “even then [...] / standing my full height / in body / and mind”.
He positions the 'patients' as passive, docile bodies, unthinkingly awaiting 'cure', 
and buying into ‘the garbage' delusions of the medical staff:
“none had any idea of what really getting better entailed, / and none 
appeared to have any coherent notion / of any positive direction for 
their lives.
Seeing that all the indications / were that the doctors had no idea 
either, / it was evidently a case of the blind leading the blind.”
Philip elaborates on his relationship with one 'patient' in particular, who he then 
saw as a “powerful being of light”, however, he continues to position himself as 
the only one who really sees 'what is'. The “lack of rapport” Philip experienced 
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with most of the other 'patients' is located in the 'unenlightened' other. He denies 
the validity of any “mental illness”, dismissing labels like “Depression” and 
“Schizophrenia”, instead suggesting that these are manifestations of different 
kinds of “garbage interference”, and better responded to with his own “self-
actualizing” techniques, developed from and verified by direct experience.
3.3.4. “Part 4: We Want To Keep You Under Observation”
The rhetorical function of this final part might be universalising the benefits of 
self-actualisation. Towards this end Philip continues his critique of psychiatry. Like
Spoon, Philip draws on literature, referencing Kafka to position the psychiatric 
institution as a “labyrinthine, / depersonalized / bureaucracy”.
Philip thickens his description of the doctors, who are “bemused by” his “rapid 
recovery” and left without a proper frame of reference for understanding the 
process. As a result, Philip is a source of fear and embarrassment to them. At 
times this fear leads the psychiatrists to “primitive and petty” behaviour, such as 
deliberately delaying ward rounds: 
“so it appears / that the doctors' behaviour / was a deliberate snub for 
me.
I suppose it was the way / they routinely treated anyone / who really 
spoke up for themselves / and did not 'toe the Party line'.”
Through the following strophes Philip describes his frustration at his experience 
of ward rounds: including cancellations, delays and unreasonable questioning. 
After nearly two weeks Philip is allowed a home visit, with follow-ups, before 
returning to the ward for a final meeting, diagnosis, and his official discharge. 
Philip describes the reception of his “special qualities” (e.g., spiritual guidance, 
having a higher purpose) in a ward round setting:
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“it was clear that, / to these men of limited outlook, / my receiving 
guidance / was none other than 'hearing voices' / and thus, in their 
eyes, / to be seen as a psychiatric disorder.
For them, the expression 'hearing voices' / was like a Pavlovian trigger.
I got the strong impression / that their minds were loaded with a small /
and unedifying repertoire / of such trigger expressions / that rang the 
"DISORDER!" bell for them.”
Philip rejects the psychiatric frame by reducing it to the absurd. Equating 
diagnosis to a reflex action (effectively deploying psychological 'truth' against 
psychiatric 'truth') positions the psychiatrists as unthinking and reactionary. This is
problematised when Philip as narrator disavows his 'guidance' as the work of the 
'garbage'; he is clear though that the psychiatrists were still making a “woefully 
inaccurate assumption / that [hearing voices] is just malfunction of the mind or 
brain / and that there is nothing external / actually communicating with the 
person”. Like Spoon and Sarah, Philip's PLE remains external to the self. 
In what is becoming a complex truth-game Philip reverses the gaze as he tells us
that the suggestion that his PLE was “hearing voices” allowed: 
“my first really strong nudge / towards beginning to understand / the 
universality of interferences from the garbage, / so that I could before 
long / start to use my own experiences / for the benefit of mental 
healthcare generally / on a global basis / - as I am now doing, / largely 
through this website.”
The universal and external nature of PLE storied as 'garbage interference' 
provides Philip with something of value to offer on “a global basis”. He expands 
this beyond mental health, suggesting that “virtually all unbidden sexual desires” 
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that people experience are caused by 'the garbage' steering them away from 
“love” and towards “self gratification”. Elevating 'the garbage' in this way, Philip is 
able to position himself as a potential prophetic leader. His struggle is not through
madness, but out of basic insanity – we can all learn from his path. He has 
something significant to share with the world. Tragically, the world is unable to 
hear it.
The doctors' final response to Philip's “special qualities” is a diagnosis of “Mild 
Schizotype”. Storyline Philip positions himself alongside “Jesus and all our 
healers and spiritual teachers”, whom, from this “limited outlook” would require 
“hospitalization and treatment / to bring them down to a blinding mediocrity / of 
some supposed normality”. Reviewing this as narrator, through the lens of 'the 
garbage', Philip expands his reach still further, all these spiritual teachers were in 
fact, “under covert control from the garbage” and “the way forward for every one 
of them would be through the sort of healing / self actualization methodology that 
I present”. 
In the final strophes, Philip introduces a “distinct air of something akin to sadness”
about his doctors, as they had:
“some inner sense, / probably not really formulated in their minds, / 
that I was not only beyond their reach / but also that I had something 
precious / that they felt was barred to them”. 
This serves as an example of the universal value of PLE as transformative 
experience. The doctors are trapped by “blocked awareness” in a mediocre 
'reality', with “no idea of what real happiness was like”. Philip's 'reality' is precious 
and barred to them, not because it is physically unavailable, but because it is 
repressed by fear, or social obligations. 
In summarising, he re-stories his own experience, with a new sense of agency. In
the re-telling his PLE episode began when he “initiated the positive changes” 
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which: 
“meant stepping outside my limits / as perceived at that time, / the 
prospect of facing disapproval / from some quarters / and losing 
certain friends / could feel intimidating and scary, / but this became 
outweighed / as I gave proper consideration / to where I could be 
pointing”. 
Finally, Philip, transformed by knowledge of 'the garbage', is able to step back 
from negative ways of relating to others:
“I am beginning / to draw in people / who are truly like-minded / and 
LOVE me / - and that love is mutual.”
This brings us to Philip's final message. If we can step beyond our own “limited 
outlooks”, and open up to “What Is”:
“We discover / more and more / that it is as though the world, / the 
Universe, / the entirety of 'What Is', / has been ever so patiently waiting
all along / for us to make each step / and gently encourage us forward 
to the next one […] / thus maximizing the abundance and variety of our
life experience.”
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4. FURTHER ANALYSIS
4.1. A Foucauldian Hermeneutic of Suspicion
We cannot have a “view from nowhere” (Ricouer, 1981). Here, I take an explicitly 
Foucauldian position to ’re-viewing' my initial analysis. I will draw primarily upon 
Foucault's discussion of 'counter-conduct' in relation to the Christian Pastorate 
(Foucault, 2006a), as I have identified certain correspondences with the 
‘resistances’ evident in the current accounts. The narratives could be read as 
'counter-conducts' not only of psychiatry, but of a particular form of neo-liberal 
governmentality.
For Foucault, resistance entails a self-constitution based upon critique 
(Thompson, 2003). Critique offers opportunities for self-creativity within a 
restricted field of possible action. The three narratives, as critiques or 
problematisations, can be seen as acts “of voluntary inservitude, of reflective 
indocility” within this field of possible action; the essential function of which is 
“desubjectification” (Foucault, 1996:386). Such a critique “consists in seeing on 
what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of
thinking the accepted practices are based” (Foucault, 2003a:172). 
In the three narratives we witness a tactical reversal by which particular 
understandings of PLE are utilized against the structures of psychiatric power. 
Two modes of critique can be identified. The first addresses the dimorphism 
between psychiatrist and 'patient'. The accounts reverse the psychiatric gaze. 
This is a 'game of visibility' – the 'patient' moves from being seen, to seeing. 
Speaking on visibility, Foucault argues that power is most tolerable when 
masked. Removing the mask is one possible act of counter-conduct. The extent 
to which these accounts trouble the psychiatric mask varies; what is universally 
brought into question is a related 'mask', a material-realist conception of what can
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be said to exist. The 'reality' of PLE makes visible the restricted world-view of 
psychiatry (most explicitly for Philip), and the limits of 'consensus reality' (for all 
three). Here, being 'imprisoned' in a mental hospital speaks to the madness of 
the system, not the madness of the narrator. In reversing the gaze, the narrators 
escape the subjectification of examination, and reject identities as 'mental 
patients'. They are then able to take up the position of observers, whose 
experiences allow insight, and the space for critique.
The second, interrelated, mode of critique could be called 'truth games'. 
Reversing the gaze problematises the absolute right of non-madness over 
madness; the psychiatrist's position as “master of madness”; and his privileged 
position with regards to the proximity to truth (Foucault, 2006a). Locating insanity 
within the psychiatrist, and the medical system, invokes a suspension of their 
power to determine 'reality' for the would-be-patient. The psychiatrist no longer 
functions as the conduit between the would-be-patient and the 'truth'. All three 
accounts take up the ancient discourse which associates madness with wisdom 
(Foucault, 1970); for the narrators, PLE provides immediate revelation, and direct
access to 'truth'. Each of the accounts reverses the hierarchy of 'truth', 
demanding a dialogue in response to psychiatric monologue, and insisting that 
psychiatry and the 'realists' learn from their experience.
These accounts represent a “revolt of conduct” (Foucault, 2007:171), that is, 
'counter-conduct' developed in response to “crises of governmentality”. The 
accounts share crises' brought about by a refusal of authority, such as that 
outlined above. As each account responds to these crises, they can be read as 
idiosyncratic versions of spiritual 'counter-conduct'. 
According to Foucault (1980:131) “we are subjected to the production of truth 
through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of 
truth”. The 'truths' produced by these 'counter-conduct' narratives share certain 
correspondences. Each draws on a 'bricolage' of 'New Age', 'spiritual' and 
psychological discourses (themselves bricolages of older technologies). Each 
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makes an appeal to what Foucault has called a “metaphysic of the infinite” 
(1970:316), a transcendent order of representation outside 'consensus reality'. 
The grand project of each appears to be giving birth to a new kind of human 
experience (although these 'projects' need not be achieved in order for the 'truths'
to be productive). What must be achieved is a transformation of the self; there 
remains a need for salvation (although not from 'illness'), and a duty to conduct 
one’s own conduct.
The narrators demonstrate ongoing concern for their own conduct. They have not
freed themselves from power relations, but repositioned themselves within them, 
such that new possibilities for action become available. Consequently these 
'counter-conduct' strategies function as a sort of internal-'pastorate', a different 
governmentality. This new governmentality is not equivalent to that which it 
replaces. It is a 'self' centred struggle. The privileged status of PLE, the 
immediacy of communication, to some extent escapes pastoral power, and allows
a shift of authority towards personal experience. Because it is an exercise of self-
on-self “the authority, presence, and gaze of someone else is, if not impossible, 
at least unnecessary” (Foucault, 2007:204). Authority over the self leads to a 
“reversed obedience which becomes egoistic self mastery” (ibid:207). In fact, 
because they draw on a bricolage of discourses, each narrator comes under the 
influence of multiple authorities, but no one formative authority. Thus, there are 
ongoing and significant obligations for our narrators, most evident in their 
disavowal of unenlightened modes of behaviour, thought and feeling. These 
'counter-conducts' then, have their own privileged dogma, hierarchy, rituals, 
postures, and forms of social action and community. The psychiatrist-patient 
dimorphism is replaced by a dimorphism of 'enlightened' and 'unenlightened' 
individuals. These binaries are not equivalent, the new order is less determinate; 
enlightenment is a state rather than a trait and is theoretically universally 
accessible.
Foucault developed his notion of 'counter-conduct' into 'subjectivation' (Kelly, 
2013) – the process of producing a mode of existence for one's self, which itself 
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can be a form of resistance. As Foucault (2006b:252) wrote, there is “No first or 
final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to 
oneself”. This is less reactive than 'reversal', as one acts autonomously in caring 
for oneself, within the confines of the possible field of action. As Kelly (2013:513) 
summarises, “the subject constitutes itself in different forms at different times 
through the use of varied practices, but always by distinguishing itself from the 
physical body that engages in those practices”. Our narrators' 'counter-conduct' 
actions represent 'techniques and practices of the self' – such as 'Inner Inquiry' or
disavowing desire – through which they constitute themselves, in an active 
fashion, as something more than a physical body. Foucault stresses that these 
practices are not pure invention: “They are models he finds in his culture and are 
proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, his social 
group” (1997:291). In response to ambiguous and disintegrated PLE, and a 'crisis
of governmentality' the authors make attempts to know themselves and 'reality' 
anew, putting into practice new metaphysical conceptions of themselves by 
assembling a bricolage of the available discursive resources. In doing so, they 
avoid being 'malignantly positioned' by the mental health system (Sabat, 2003).
The bricolage, being diffuse in nature, having an absence of leaders, allows for a 
certain creativity regarding the subjectivity produced. The narrators take agency 
in selecting by whom they consent to be conducted – who will lead them and in 
what direction they will be led. Each narrator calls on and privileges certain texts 
(i.e., spiritual, academic, sci-fi, and literary) – a purposeful sampling of the ways 
humanity has understood itself. No one text is given ultimate authority, even 
'spirituality' itself can be disavowed. Psychiatry backgrounds its texts, and locates
authority in the psychiatrist who interprets the word. Here, the texts speak for 
themselves and have no need for authoritative relay, at least for the narrator. The 
abundance of potential texts allows for considerable flexibility in agency. The 
three narratives are united within this multiplicity only insofar as they are 
orientated by a conception of self-transformation.
Considerations of community and communication are vital for the narrators in 
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situating themselves acceptably within 'society', and thereby retaining this 
creativity. With regards to communication, they have not escaped the compulsion
of confession, as communicating their PLE seems requisite to 'integration' and 
transformation. The ineffability of PLE therefore problematises their 'counter-
conduct'. The narrators' responses to this problematisation draw on the 
unenlightened-enlightened dimorphism: communication failures are externalised, 
and transferred to the alternate 'unenlightened' node, who is subjectified as 
'unable to see the truth'. Thus, the construction of an authoritative 'higher self' 
instantiates a certain isolation from devalued 'normal' people, at the same time 
that universality and connection are emphasised. A practice of silence develops, 
as the narrators refuse to speak in contexts in which they may be misunderstood.
By selecting their audiences they are more likely to enjoy what Foucault, in 
another context altogether (1976:6), has called the “speaker's benefit”, i.e., “to 
utter truths and promise bliss” is an appealing position to speak from. They take 
up the prophetic pose of the sage, who speaks for humanity: “outside of power 
and within the truth” (ibid:130); but only insofar as they speak in the appropriate 
context.
Connection to like-minded communities legitimise the accounts. Foucault 
identified the power implicit in mystical communities that made alternate readings
of Christian scripture. In much the same way, spiritual communities, such as 
Sarah's White Eagle Lodge, offer counter-readings of 'reality' and 'mental illness'. 
By disqualifying the psychiatrist's role, these communities allow new subjectivities
to emerge. They are connected by a mutual 'unreality', a failure of the modernist 
paradigm to account for their lived-experience, which allows them to co-construct 
a new 'reality'. While real-world relationships are clearly important to our 
narrators, the presence of these accounts online highlights the importance of 
virtual communities. Cyber-communities offer a place of inclusion, and a site for 
subversion; where counter-narratives can be shared. Online it is possible to enter
into confrontation with the psychiatric discourse without having to subject the 
embodied self to scrutiny. Each of the narrators has found online a space for 
agonism, which opens up the possibility of new subjectivities, and allows 
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madness to emerge from its silence. Moreover, sharing their accounts publicly 
positions our narrators as modern sages, whose identity claims can be bolstered 
by supposed or real followers.
Finally, I will consider the consequences of this counter-conduct for the medical 
model of psychiatry, and neo-liberal governmentality more broadly. The 
unsuccessful exercise of psychiatric power reveals possible points of 
insubordination, which were points of 'escape' for the narrators. For instance, 
consider how, despite being sectioned, Philip would not be forced into the 
'patient' role, rebranding himself a 'prisoner'. Psychiatry, with its prodigious 
surplus of disciplinary power, is shown to be vulnerable to the power of the 
'patient', who, by refusing confession and psychiatric pastoral authority, can 
refuse to establish the psychiatrist as a doctor, and pull away the 'mask' by 
referring him back to his disciplinary role. Both Spoon and Philip explicitly use 
their 'incarcerations' to develop their critique, allowing them unique insights. By 
intensifying and extending its power, psychiatry was forced to reveal its limits. 
However, the narrators' practice of silence reduces their impact on the local 
psychiatric systems. By publishing their stories they may facilitate others in taking
up such stances, hence, although the resistance is initially individual and private, 
it becomes serial and public, through resonance.
These narratives transgress the limits of authority. “Transgression forces the limit 
to recognize and acknowledge what it excludes, and hence "the world is forced to
question itself" (Foucault, 1967:231). The accounts transgress, and to some 
extent trouble, the reason-unreason divide. However, for all three narrators, 
demonstrating adherence to other modes of 'normalisation', that are the bedrock 
of neo-liberal governmentality, is central to their avoiding the disciplinary arm of 
psychiatric power. Essentially, the accounts seek to bring PLE into the 'normal' 
fold by demonstrating the competence, rationality and lack of 'idleness' of the 
authors. Whilst there is an implicit critique of the modernist paradigm, this too is 
minimised by the compulsion to silence. Hence, these narratives are not a 
rejection of governmentality and neo-liberalism, per se, but of a local and 
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individualising, essentially pastoral, power over another's self. They represent a 
move to resist control of the self, not of the collective.
At times, then, these accounts go beyond reversals, which affirm a value for 
madness which has been repressed. By stressing their unique insights, and 
particularly the externality of PLE, and, therefore, its importance in relation to 
'what is', they suggest we all must open ourselves up to 'unreality', in order to 
comprehend the 'real'. In universalising the value of their experience, they take 
up an argument that Foucault himself had made: that a new ethics is required; 
and that this requires tearing down dividing practices. They authors' argue their 
examples could open up a space for a new form of experience. They trace a path
Foucault described as an “aesthetics of existence”, in which each takes 
him/herself as “object of complex and difficult elaboration” and “makes of his 
body, his behaviour, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art” 
(2003b: 50). These narratives, by attempting to universalise this message and, 
thereby, to take action upon the action of the audience, are themselves 
instantiations of power.
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5. DISCUSSION
5.1. Purpose of the Thesis
I will now demonstrate how my analysis can be made to speak to my research 
questions.
5.1.1. How do individuals who have had spiritually transformative 
Psychotic-Like-Experiences (PLEs), story these experiences?
The three accounts were storied idiosyncratically, diverging with regards to tone, 
certainty, and apparent function; however, certain commonalities were apparent 
in their operations:
 Describing a struggle for the meaning of PLE, in a context where lack of 
understanding prevailed. 
 Treating PLE as profoundly (if not directly), meaningful, and making effort 
to 'integrate' this experience into self-narrative.
 'Externalising' PLE, so that it 'existed' outside of the mind of the narrator. 
 'Universalising' rather than 'normalising' PLE; so that it became a super-
normal aspect of human experience. 
 Experiencing PLE as providing insights, and therefore a privileged 
relationship to 'truth' and right to define 'reality'.
 Establishing credibility of their 'truths' through direct experience, rhetoric, 
authoritative texts, and counter-conduct communities.
 Reconstructing 'reality' in light of the experience, and thereby, repositioning
the self.
 Transcending and discrediting the prior-self in relation to the newly 
emerged 'reality', and transformed 'self'; and maintaining a distinction 
between pre- and post-PLE self.
 Personalising the experience, PLE related to previous experiences and 
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special qualities of the narrators, which contributed to thicker self-
narratives.
 Concealing PLE from those who 'lacked insight' into the meaningfulness of
the experience.
 Seeking opportunities to share PLE with those who offered support, or 
could be supported; connecting through a shared 'unreality'.
5.1.2. What kind of identities are created? 
Each narrator presented a 'self' fundamentally transformed by PLE, brought 
closer to 'truth' by privileged experience. Identities were made powerful through 
the production of a dichotomy between the 'enlightened' (including the self) and 
the 'unenlightened' (including psychiatry and 'consensus reality'). This 'truth' 
entailed new duties and rights for the self, most particularly by demanding 
ongoing self-transformation as part of a journey towards a 'spiritual' ideal. This 
required ongoing, and onerous, 'spiritual' identity-work, which entailed rejection of
incompatible aspects of the prior-self.
'Patient' identities were also rejected; instead the narrators constructed 
themselves as fundamentally misunderstood witnesses to a 'spiritual' truth. 
Reversing the psychiatric gaze located any 'delusion' within the 'unenlightened' 
Mental Health (MH) system. This reversal was problematised, and quietened, by 
the 'lack of insight' of 'unenlightened' others; and by the narrators' own distancing 
of their experiences from 'regressive psychosis'. Demonstrating this distance 
required the construction of productive, rational, competent and relatively docile 
selves. 
On-going PLE can easily be incorporated, even welcomed, within these 
'enlightened' self-narratives. Here, PLE does not entail a stigmatising, hope-
dashing, return of 'illness' (McCann & Clarke, 2004), but rather, a confirmation of 
‘spiritual awakening’. As 'enlightened selves', the narrators have the potential to 
contribute meaningfully, not only to others with PLEs, but more broadly (because 
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of the universal quality of their experience), to a global 'spiritual awakening'.
5.1.3. Which narrative resources do they draw upon? 
The narrators took a 'bricolage' approach, drawing selectively from the 
techniques and practices available within their local contexts. Given the identified 
similarities in their overall narrative structure, surprisingly little is shared between 
the accounts; although the narratives drawn upon appear to belong to the same 
family of ideas (mostly having their roots in 'Eastern' modes of thought, and 
privileging a 'unitive' rather than 'dualist' world-view).
Initially, each narrator made sense of their PLEs within explanatory frameworks 
which were immediately available, although ongoing 'spiritual identity work' meant
exploring wider knowledges, which thickened these understandings. The 
narratives drawn upon were not new to the narrators, although the implications 
for self were significantly revised in light of their PLE. Multiple narratives were 
drawn upon such that none dominated; this allowed the narrators significant 
flexibility with regards the rights and duties they took up. 
5.1.4. What does this afford them in relation to the medical model?
The analysis revealed some of the complexities of the politics of truth in MH. The 
stories were demonstrated to operate in relation to psychiatric power in a manner
comparable to a historical 'mystical' 'counter-conduct' which developed in 
response to the dominant Christian pastorate (Foucault, 2006a). Essentially, by 
troubling a realist conception of 'reality', the narratives produced a position 
outside of the psychiatric discourse. By demonstrating competence they refused 
the psychiatrist his position as 'doctor' and his right to determine their 'reality'. In 
exercising this power the narrators produced new 'spiritual' 'truths'; accepting 
which necessitated ongoing work upon the self.
Each narrator developed and articulated a critique of psychiatry, but none 
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communicated openly with MH services in the 'real world' during their PLE. This 
selective communication seems to maintain the dichotomy between 'spiritual' 
PLE and 'regressive psychosis'. However, in making their accounts public they 
puncture the 'terministic screen' of the medical model. By demonstrating the 
value they found in reconceptualising their PLE as variously spiritual they provide
narrative resources for others, thus, extending their resistance beyond the 
individual level; at the same time as strengthening their own identity projects.
 
5.2. Situating the Research in the Literature
This research is agonistic with much of the literature, which reifies 'psychosis', 
'schizophrenia' and the 'medical model'. It is in line with research which is critical 
of this approach (e.g., Boyle, 2002), and which advocates for the utility of 
alternative explanatory models (e.g., Romme & Escher, 2000). The narratives I 
have identified, and my analysis, trouble the pessimistic medical narrative of 
'psychosis'. These accounts support the notion of a 'psychosis-continuum' (BPS, 
2000); and van Os et al.'s (2009) contention that most PLE “are transitory and 
disappear over time” (p.179). More specifically, they shed light on observations 
that many 'in recovery' from 'psychosis' consider themselves transformed by the 
experience (Tooth et al., 2003), and offer a way to understand this phenomenon.
The accounts share characteristics with the 'enlightenment' genre identified by 
Thornhill et al. (2004), but, under close analysis, appear more nuanced, and are 
not satisfactorily captured by this category, also containing aspects of Thornhill's 
'endurance' and 'escape' genres. Furthermore, Thornhill and colleagues' focus on
'recovery' from 'psychosis' fails to capture the experiences described by my 
narrators; all of whom reject the medical notion of 'recovery'. The phases of 
transformative experience identified by Nixon et al. (2009), and the six categories
of paradigm-shifting PLE identified by Williams (2012), can also be discerned in 
these accounts, suggesting that the same phenomenon is being explored. That 
these models offer little further insight into the experience described by the three 
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narrators demonstrates the limited utility of descriptive models, without 
accompanying in-depth analysis of how such constructs operate.
My findings are broadly in line with psychological models of PLE, which reframe 
'psychosis' as a 'problem-solving' or 'paradigm-shifting' process (e.g., Perry, 
1999; Jackson, 2010). In each of the self-narratives we see PLE arising in the 
context of an intolerable situation; the PLE destabilising a previously firmly held 
worldview; and a subsequent, fundamental re-conceptualisation of 'reality', which 
re-positions the individual in the social world, and in relation to authority 
structures, facilitating new modes of agency. The findings also support Williams' 
(2012) contention that it is the 'unitive' nature of PLE which encourages 
paradigm-shifting; as it appears to have been this 'unitive' quality that allowed the
narrators to conclude that their experiences were universally significant.
Some literature suggests that a 'strong observing ego' (e.g., Jung, 1960; Clarke, 
2010; Williams, 2012) distinguishes transformative experiences from 'psychosis' 
– the narrative lens offers a different interpretation. The accounts examined 
herein share a narrative structure in which PLE is meaningful, externalised, and 
universalised. Accepting that the narratives available to us shape our experience 
(Burr, 1995), one can appreciate that self-narratives sharing these characteristics 
might produce more 'transformative' outcomes than a medical understanding, i.e.,
by instilling hope, and offering a wider field of possible actions, by undoing 
stigma, and offering preferred subject positions. This research suggests that 
determining which factors facilitate this kind of narration may have greater clinical
utility than searching for new intra-personal deficiencies, such as the 'weak ego'; 
and that the sub-cultural narrative context of the narrator may be important.
This is relevant to Lysaker and colleagues' (2010; 2012) work. Their research 
demonstrates the disruption of narrative in those who inhabit the 'patient' identity, 
but largely fails to attend to the co-construction of identity that happens in MH 
services, and argues instead for the importance of 'insight' into 'disorder'. The 
narrators demonstrate that transformation, or 'recovery', following PLE is 
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possible, separate from subscription to medical understandings; and further, that 
such a subscription may be problematic. 
Finally my research speaks to two central questions within the critical literature: 
how do some people who have unusual experiences avoid becoming service 
users? (Boyle, 2006); and why has the psychiatric narrative persisted? (Bentall, 
2009). A partial response to both is found in my analysis: the narrators avoided, 
or escaped, identities as service users through 'spiritual identity' work and 
carefully controlled communication, thereby avoiding contestation in the medical 
frame (a silence which allows the psychiatric narrative to 'persist'). In addition, 
and to varying extents, the narrators directly reified the psychiatric frame by 
'othering' the 'regressive psychotic'.
5.3. Evaluation
The criteria used to critique quantitative research are not appropriate for 
qualitative methods (Yardley, 2000). For instance, my analysis is not 
representative; I employed a highly restricted sample chosen for their special 
attributes. Nor is it exactly replicable; I offer just one of many possible 
interpretations. In reviewing the 'quality' of this study I will refer to Yardley's 
(2000) characteristics of good qualitative research.
5.3.1. Sensitivity to context
To ensure sensitivity to the theoretical context of the study, I reviewed the 
literature in the introduction. Above I attempted to develop this theory by linking it 
to the specifics of my findings. 
Although the significance of the data appearing online was considered, and only 
UK accounts selected, the socio-cultural context of the narrators is largely left 
unexplored. The narratives become somewhat disembodied, although this is 
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remedied to the extent that they describe their own context. However, the lack of 
attention to the socio-cultural context of the narrators remains a limitation. An 
advantage of this distanced approach to my data collection (asides from 
accessing unusual and interesting data), is that typical research concerns 
regarding the power imbalance between the researcher and the researched are 
avoided. However, this leaves the narrators in a totally passive role with regards 
to my interpretation, where an alternative methodology might have given them a 
more active position. 
5.3.2. Commitment and Rigour
Commitment in this context is demonstrated by my prolonged engagement with 
the topic, as demonstrated by my introduction and by my immersion in a related 
but broader 'dataset' (as reflected in section 1.2.), for instance, my experiences 
with the Spiritual Crisis Network. 
“Rigour refers to the resulting completeness of the data collection and analysis” 
(Yardley, 2000:221). The sample was small, hardly comprehensive; however, as I
have previously argued (Section 2.4.1.1.), the three narratives, studied in-depth, 
provided all the material necessary to illustrate the narrative processes under 
investigation. Regarding analysis, the 'completeness' of my interpretation was 
bolstered by my inclusion of two distinct analytic levels, which could be 
considered a form of triangulation.
5.3.3. Transparency and Coherence 
I have already argued for the coherence of my research questions, philosophical, 
methodological, and analytic approach (Chapter 2). I also sought to demonstrate 
transparency with regards to every aspect of my data collection, reading, and the 
analytic steps taken (See Chapter 2, and Appendix 7.5 and 7.6).
My moment of reflexive engagement (1.2.) represents another move towards 
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'transparency', wherein I considered how my own experiences may have 
influenced my interpretations. However, this attempt was necessarily partial, and 
could never be comprehensive. I have, therefore, been transparent in describing 
this as a single interpretation.
The most significant challenge to the 'coherence' of this thesis is the argument 
that the experiences of the narrators are fundamentally different from those of 
others who are diagnosed 'psychotic', as I have frequently drawn equivalences  
throughout. This argument can be countered: firstly, two of the three narrators 
were, temporarily, service users themselves, and received 'psychosis' related 
diagnoses, whilst the third was arguably qualified to 'self-diagnose', and did; and 
secondly, because, as I have demonstrated, the validity of a distinction between 
the two types of experience has been troubled (e.g., Jackson, 1997).
Ultimately, the reader is best placed to judge the transparency and coherence of 
my presentation.
5.3.4. Impact and Importance 
Yardley (2000:223) argues that “the decisive criterion by which any piece of 
research must be judged is, arguably, its impact and utility.” It is to these factors 
that I finally turn.
5.4. Implications
5.4.1. For Research
I am in agreement with Radden (2012), who argues that the 'mentally ill' have 
suffered a systematic and damaging mis-recognition, for which the remedy lies in 
redefining 'madness'. In this process, the 'mad', rather than simply being heard, 
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must be accorded the status of 'credible knowers'. I would further argue that a full
understanding of 'madness', means looking beyond the clinic, the ward, and the 
counter-movement, to those who experience PLE beyond the medical frame.
Radden suggests first-person accounts represent a useful point of departure for 
this broader project of redefinition. This thesis supports that suggestion, and 
further, has demonstrated the research utility of the vast dataset available online. 
That so much data is indexed allows for remarkable specificity in data collection, 
free from many of the usual complications of power. Further research on first 
person accounts, online or offline, might examine in more detail, or within 
different contexts, how the patient 'identity' is avoided. Arguably, more interesting 
is what kind of identities are created instead, that is, which narratives have 
sufficient illocutionary force to override the medical narrative, and under what 
circumstances?
Exploring a broadly 'spiritual' narrative of psychosis has demonstrated that PLE 
can coherently be conceptualised as 'spiritual' experience; that 'spiritual' 
narratives can make meaningful objects of study; and that this offers insight into 
processes generally understood as 'mental illness'. I follow Clarke (2010), in 
calling for a paradigm shift in the way we conceptualise and research 'psychosis',
that recognises both the narrative restrictions of the medical model, and the 
'spiritual' significance of PLE.
More specifically, my analysis suggests that more research is required into the 
role of the narrative environment in the development of 'psychosis', which might 
offer another perspective on research that internalises narrative deficiencies 
within the 'patient' (e.g., Lysaker, 2010); and which explores the practices and 
implications of the 'tactical silencing' of 'spiritual' accounts in MH services.
5.4.2. For Clinical Practice
What is needed more urgently than yet more research into PLE, is a better way to
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respond. Only part of this response is the way PLE is received clinically, although 
this is the area in which Clinical Psychology may be able to exert greatest 
influence.
To begin with, we should not assume that all PLE brought to our clinical attention 
is experienced as distressing, and in need of remedy (Cromby & Harper, 2012). 
This means considering the context of referrals: 'who identifies PLE as a 
problem?'; 'how does the experiencer understand PLE?'; and 'how PLE is 
received in their local context?'. In some cases, the most appropriate response 
will be supporting the individual and their network to communicate PLE more 
effectively.
If we are resolved to work at the individual level, one option is to consider how 
Narrative therapy (White, 2007) might support the individual and their network in 
exploring the implications of the stories they tell about each other and those told 
about them by others, and to begin to author new and preferred stories. My 
analysis demonstrates that even PLE which was experienced as meaningless 
can be reintegrated into a transformative self-narrative when the appropriate 
structure become available. Narrative therapy, with its specific metaphors for 
externalising constructs, attending to personal meaning, and thickening 
preferred-narratives may support this reintegration. Holding in mind the 
operations of the accounts analysed above might facilitate clinicians working with 
individuals to scaffold more empowering self-narratives. 
Beyond individual therapy, narrative theory encourages us to consider our own 
contribution to the narratives landscape. Modifying individual narratives may be 
insufficient if the wider culture is not accepting of these new understandings. The 
analysis revealed that MH services were experienced as distant, generally 
unhelpful, and threatening to newly emerging self-understanding (as well as 
liberty). A great deal of identity work is necessary to escape the negative identity 
implications of the medical model. Recent developments in MH approaches to 
'psychosis', such as Community Treatment Orders, and Early Intervention in 
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Psychosis teams, threaten to push the medical narrative deeper into our 
collective narrative reservoir. 
We must take the narrative implications of this pessimistic model seriously, and 
consider what changes are necessary. In particular, we must resist privileging our
own world-view, and attributing lack of insight to those who do not share it. Within
the 'spiritual' narrative, the world-view represented by the medical model (and 
consensus reality) is akin to a 'psychosis': being a suboptimal and distorted 
reality, which fails to recognise its own distortion. The 'spiritual' narrative creates 
a 'reality' which is no less 'real' than that promoted by the 'psy-complex', and is 
arguably a ‘better’ metaphor for the ineffable pre-narrative experience, being 
potentially implicated in improved outcomes. I join Chadwick (2010) in urging that
we no longer ignore the 'spiritual' aspects of PLE, and instead create space for 
these understandings within services, thereby offering hope and meaning to 
'patients'. This requires clinicians, and services, not only to be open to such 
experiences, but to find ways to articulate this openness, and to allow our clients 
to bring unusual experiences to us without fear of unwanted treatment or 
diagnosis (Hagen & Nixon, 2010). Furthermore, we should consider how MH 
services influence broader cultural narratives around madness, and seek remedy 
where our involvement limits the meaning-making opportunities of those we seek 
to serve.
If we accept that some PLE represent transformative or paradigm shifting 
processes, we also need to think about how these might be supported. Williams 
(2012) employs a butterfly chrysalis metaphor to argue that the transformative 
process necessarily entails a period of increased 'vulnerability' (as the old self is 
broken down, and before the new self is established). As a result, the process 
requires a supportive, or at least non-harmful, environment to resolve properly. 
My research suggests that a facilitative environment would offer alternative 
understandings while privileging none, a supportive community, and opportunities
to narrate one's experience. 'Alternative' medication-free residential facilities, 
which offer such safe, supportive environments, and a meaningful narrative of 
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psychosis (as a process of renewal), have demonstrated good outcomes (e.g. 
Calton et al., 2008), but struggled to attract funding. The Open Dialogue 
approach (Seikkula et al., 2001) attempts to create the same conditions in a 
community/family context, and has replaced traditional psychiatric services in 
Western Lapland. These services now work with families and communities to 
develop a supportive network around the individual, and aim to privilege 
individual understandings, treating all understandings as valuable. In turn, this 
has transformed the psychiatric narrative in the region, and led to radical 
improvements in outcome (Seikkula et al., 2006). In fact, the Open Dialogue 
approach may have gone even further, and transformed the cultural reception of 
'psychosis' in Western Lapland, since, over 30 years, a significant proportion of 
the population have participated in network meetings (which insist on the value of
individual understandings), and been exposed to these alternative narratives 
(Seikkula, 2014).
Both approaches above have demonstrated efficacy, but also significant 
challenges in deployment and despite significant interest have failed to become 
widely-available. This itself may be related to the dominance of a medical 
understanding of 'psychosis' amongst those in a position to determine service 
provision, leading to an insistence on 'treatment' as a primary response, and, 
typically, a conflation of 'treatment' with 'antipsychotic' medication. Finding ways 
to challenge this narrative hegemony should be a clinical priority.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must stop believing that these 
experiences belong to the clinical domain – a 'belief' my research has suggested 
may be highly problematic. Individuals experiencing PLE should not be denied 
access to the most empowering and meaningful understandings of their 
experiences. For 'spiritual' PLE in those who present to us as 'clients', this may 
involve working alongside, or referring to, 'non-traditional healers', for instance, 
yoga instructors or spiritualists. Beyond the client-clinician relationship we should 
recognise the value of 'peer support' networks, as they can represent 'counter-
conduct' communities: validating culturally-marginalised discourses; providing 
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alternative readings of PLE; and reinstating hope and meaning. Examples in the 
UK include the Hearing Voices Network, and The Spiritual Crisis Network. 
Clinicians should look for opportunities to support, and be supported by, these 
organisations. Such groups are already working to change the narrative 
landscape of PLE, and may be better placed to achieve this than NHS clinicians.
'Peer support' also exists online, as do a plethora of narratives regarding the 'true'
nature of PLE. This research has begun to examine the implications of this 
revolutionary narrative arena for the development of preferred and marginalised 
self-narratives. Certainly new subjectivities have been made possible, partially 
demonstrated by these accounts. However, I would argue that the broadest 
implications of our radically enhanced connectivity have yet to emerge; will be 
more readily apparent in the next generation; and should be closely attended to.
5.5. Conclusion
I have argued that the apparent dichotomy of PLE, between 'spiritual awakening' 
and 'regressive breakdown', should not be understood as the relation between 
two distinct phenomena, but as representing two extreme positions on a 
continuum of one kind of human experience. In addition, I argued that the 
position one takes up along this continuum is to some extent determined by how 
one comes to understand the experience, and how one integrates this into 'self-
narrative'.  Finally I have argued that this process of integration is itself influenced
by the culturally-available narrative resources, and that, for some, MH services 
have a significant role in promoting or denying particular ways of knowing.
As MH practitioners we have a duty to attend to the discursive context we co-
create with 'clients', 'service users' or 'patients'. In doing so we may be able to 
support these individuals in integrating what are oftentimes frightening 
experiences into narrative frameworks which offer hope, meaning, and a positive 
sense of self. By demonstrating that understanding can be found beyond the 
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medical narrative of PLE we may even start to loosen the modernist stranglehold 
on 'consensus reality', and to open up a space for the 'multiple voices' and 
'multiple realities' which make up human experience.
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7. APPENDICES
 
7.1. Appendix 1: Glossary
Mysticism – Distinctive practices, discourses, texts, traditions, and experiences 
aimed at human transformation, or at achieving direct experience of the 'Divine', 
the ‘Ultimate’, or with ‘Absolute Reality’. Also, a belief in 'higher' forms of 'reality', 
which are at once beyond perceptual apprehension, and directly accessible to 
subjective experience.
Psychotic-Like-Experience (PLE) – A term to describe a plethora of 'out of the 
ordinary' experience (OOE) that might meet the psychiatric criteria for 'psychotic 
experience', but may also be responded to, or understood, very differently, for 
instance, as 'spiritual' or 'mystical' experience. PLEs can include hearing voices, 
or seeing things, that others do not. I have used PLE, rather than OOE or any 
other term, because I am concerned here with the nexus of 'spiritual' and 
'psychiatric' ways-of-knowing, and hoped to keep this in focus as I discuss 
experiences largely understood as 'spiritual'. I do not mean that these 
experiences would be better understood as 'psychosis', only that such an 
understanding is possible.
Psychosis – An ongoing 'condition' predominated by out-of-the-ordinary 
experiences that generally cause significant distress or disruption to the 
experiencer. Also a generic term for mental states in which the individual is 
judged by others to have lost touch with 'reality', because they have “experiences
such as hearing voices other people do not hear, seeing or sensing things other 
people do not see or sense, holding unusual beliefs (delusions) or beliefs about 
the malevolent intention of others which seem unwarranted (paranoia)” (Thornhill 
et al., 2004:181). Often associated, or used synonymously with psychiatric 
diagnoses like 'Schizophrenia'.
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Schizophrenia – A formal diagnosis within The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) Psychiatric classification system. A 'psychotic 
condition', characterised by positive symptoms such as 'delusions', 
'hallucinations', and 'disorganized speech', but also 'negative symptoms', such as
'affective flattening'. DSM-V  raised the symptom threshold, to be diagnosed one 
must now have at least two (rather than one) of these symptoms present over a 
period of one month or more, AND a significant social or occupational dysfunction
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
Spirituality – Variously defined, this term describes an inward and personal 
sense of the 'sacred' or 'divine'. For instance, “the feelings, thoughts, experiences
and behaviours that arise from a search for the sacred” (Hill et al., 2000:66), or "a
transcendent dimension within human experience […] discovered in moments in 
which the individual questions the meaning of personal existence and attempts to
place the self within a broader ontological context." (Shafranske & Gorsuch, 
1984).
Religion – Describe organised human relationships with the 'sacred' or 'divine'. 
Refers to relations that have become 'canonical', meaning that they privilege 
particular writings, teachings, and structures, and view these as essential for their
devotees.
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7.2. Appendix 2:  Literature Search Strategy
In a sense my literature review began when I read Paris Williams' (2012) 
'Rethinking Madness', which led to the conception of this study. I was struck by 
the breadth of literature he was able to draw upon, the coherence of his central 
argument and the potential utility of his model. I was also struck by what 
appeared to be a central, but largely unattended to, role for narrative in 
understanding both why 'spiritual' understandings of psychosis seemed to lead to
positive outcomes, and in explaining the apparent dimorphism between 'spiritual' 
and medical PLE.
I began my formal literature review by searching the EBSCO database in August 
2013 and repeated these searches periodically until March 2014. All my searches
employed the 'all databases' and 'all years available' parameters. 'Psychosis' 
returned 144,709 papers, and 'Schizophrenia' 177,122. I therefore selected more 
focussed search terms, reflecting the interest of this project, as listed:
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Narrative
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Narrative Psychology
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Self narrative
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Illness narrative
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Recovery narrative
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Mystic*
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Spiritual*
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Relig*
Psychosis OR Schizophrenia AND Explanatory model
Madness AND [search terms as above]
Hearing Voices AND [search terms as above]
143
Hallucinat* AND [search terms as above]
I extended these searches by repeating them on Web of Science and Google 
Scholar. Potentially relevant publications were identified by a review of titles. I 
then read the abstracts of the identified papers, before reading potentially 
relevant texts in full. I excluded results which had no clear relevance to this 
project. In addition, I attended carefully to the reference lists of identified 
publications, looked for papers that cited key papers, and took recommendations 
from individuals with personal and professional interests in the overlap between 
'spiritual' and 'psychotic' phenomena. 
Many more papers were read than are referenced in the final thesis. My 
introduction represents a narrative review of the literature, as it applies to my 
research questions. It is necessarily narrow; by focussing upon narrative as a 
heuristic for understanding PLEs, I have marginalised important areas for 
consideration (particularly the role of material and developmental factors), the 
reader must decide if this decision was well-grounded.
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7.3. Appendix 3: Self-Narrative Search Strategy
Despite a the wealth of narratives online, identifying narratives that met all of my 
inclusion criteria (section 2.4.1) was a lengthy process. I used simple keyword 
searches using www.google.co.uk to identify relevant websites. For example:
'spiritual accounts of psychosis' About 8,270,000 results
'spiritual accounts of psychosis UK' About 1,370,000 results
'spiritual narratives of psychosis' About 16,500,000 results
'spiritual narratives of psychosis UK' About 13,300,000 results
'spiritual accounts of schizophrenia' About 12,800,000 results
'spiritual accounts of schizophrenia UK' About 1,300,000 results
'spiritual narratives of schizophrenia' About 14,300,000 results
'spiritual narratives of schizophrenia UK' About 11,500,000 results
'personal story psychosis spirituality' About 4,050,000 results
'personal story psychosis spirituality UK' About 17,700,000 results
'personal story schizophrenia spirituality ' About 4,240,000 results
'personal story schizophrenia spirituality UK' About 16,300,000 results
'psychosis and spirituality' About 713,000 results
'schizophrenia and spirituality' About 1,390,000 results
'schizophrenia and enlightenment' About 283,000 results
'psychosis and enlightenment' About 169,000 results
'psychosis and kundalini' About 47,200 results
'schizophrenia and kundalini' About 1,380,000 results
'psychosis and shamanism' About 45,600 results
'schizophrenia and shamanism' About 72,300 results
Clearly, each search produced a large amount of data. To manage this I explored 
the first ten pages of each search (100 results), identifying relevant webpages. I 
then 'snowballed' this data identification by following hyperlinks within these 
pages. I searched manually within this corpus for first-person accounts which met
my inclusion criteria. Often certain information (such as geographical location) 
was ambiguous, in which case the account was discarded. Once a suitable 
account was identified I contacted the author to request permission, if no reply 
was received the account was discarded. In this manner I identified the three 
accounts included in my analysis.
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7.4. Appendix 4: Permissions from Authors and Web-masters
7.4.1. Sarah
Sarah's narrative was hosted on the Royal Collage of Psychiatry (RCP) website. I
contacted the RCP in the first instance:
“Dear [RCP Staff member],
 I am a Doctoral Clinical Psychology student. I am interested in 
including an article hosted on your site in a research project I am 
conducting at the University of East London. The article is a 
transcription of a talk given to the Spirituality SIG, and can be found 
here: http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/A%20personal%20experience
%20of%20Kundalini%20%20Sarah%20Sourial%20EDITEDx.pdf
Could I please be put in touch with someone who might be able to 
grant me permission to include the article in my analysis?
 Thank you,
 James Peddie
 Trainee Clinical Psychologist
 University of East London”
Initially, I received the following reply, to which I responded, declaring that I was 
not yet 'Dr. Peddie': 
“Dear Dr Peddie 
Thank you for your email and your interest in this article. The copyright
of the article belongs to Sarah [deleted].  I’m afraid I am unable to give
you her email address but I will forward your enquiry to the Chairman 
of the Spirituality SIG to pass on.
With kind regards,
[RCP Staff member]”
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I was then contacted by Sarah directly:
“Dear Dr Peddie,
Thank you for asking permission to use my article as part of your 
analysis.
I am very happy for you to do so and I wish you all good wishes with 
your work.
Yours sincerely
Sarah”
To which I responded, once again clearing up the confusion about my 'doctor' 
status, and elaborating on the nature of my request:
“Dear Sarah,
Thank you so much for getting back to me. I found your account 
extremely interesting, not least because of its context - a presentation 
of a concept like Kundalini to a group of psychiatrists (albeit 
presumably relatively sympathetic given their attendance at the 
spirituality SIG). I would love to include it in my thesis. 
I feel it's important to point out that I am not a doctor, psychiatric or 
otherwise. I think there must have been some crossed wires in my 
communication with [RCP staff member]. I am a trainee clinical 
psychologist in my final year of my doctoral training at the University of
East London. 
My thesis is looking at how experiences traditionally diagnosed a 
treated within a medical framework (i.e. as 'psychotic') are sometimes 
interpreted by the individual within a mystical/spiritual one, with 
potentially personally transformative results. In particular I'm looking at
what narrative resources or discourses are drawn upon, what these 
'do' for the individual (in terms of self-concept, opportunities for action 
etc), and what such implicit or explicit resistance says about the 
operations of the medical discourse itself. I intend to use extended 
quotes from your presentation, and include a complete summary of the
narrative you present.
I hope that none of that has been sufficient to put you off, but please 
do get back to me one way or the other, I wouldn't feel comfortable 
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taking your consent under the pretence of being Dr Peddie! Of course 
if you have any questions please feel free to ask.
Yours sincerely,
James”
To which Sarah kindly responded with her consent:
“Dear James,
I am still very happy for you to use my paper as part of your thesis.
Having worked for many years as a psychiatric nurse, I am aware that 
for myself and clients I have nursed, meaning sometimes cannot be 
found within a medical perspective alone. In my case, until I found an 
explination from the White Eagle Lodge that seemed to match my own
experience exactly, I just felt abnormal in some way. Following my own
experience I started to use a spiritual perspective as well as a medical 
one when assessing and treating clients. Now I would say 12 years 
later that it was the best thing that could have happened to me, that it 
was a very profound event giving me much meaning in my life and that
I have developed a great deal further since then. 
Yes presenting to psychiatrists is a challenge. Next year I will be doing
the same in my own Trust which feels even more of a challenge.
Your work sounds very interesting and I would love to know more 
about it in the future if at all possible? 
I wish you the very best of luck with it all.
Yours sincerely
Sarah”
7.4.2. Spoon
Spoon's narrative was presented on his own site, as a result he is both author 
and webmaster, and was relatively easy to contact, streamlining the process 
above. I contacted Spoon, explaining the nature of my research, and the way in 
which I hoped to make use of his narrative, as I did for Sarah above. To which 
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Spoon agreed:
“Hi James
The "I am the Spoon" website is already somewhat anonymised, so 
you're welcome to quote sections and reference the website directly 
as you see fit.
Please do send me a link to whatever you publish.     
I'm also happy to discuss the content and my subsequent thoughts 
about it further.
Kind Regards,
[Spoon]”
 
7.4.3. Philip
Like Spoon, Philip's account appeared on his own website, once again simplifying
the process. Philip responded:
“Hi there, James.
Actually, I don't see what you're asking as being something requiring 
my permission - though of course I much appreciate your courtesy in 
asking.  Where I would tend to be be a right old bugger of a dog-in-
the-manger is where people ask me to give interviews or 'discuss my 
ideas' with them.  As the people who ask such things virtually always 
have their own beliefs and preconceptions, they would all be a very 
frustrating waste of time to engage with, for beliefs and an open-
minded objective approach do not mix - the beliefs inevitably seeking 
to mangle and discredit anything or anyone that seriously calls their 
belief based mindset into question.
So, of course, you're welcome to include contents of my website in 
your own review / analysis - though I do counsel that you do your best 
to heed the various cautions and caveats that I give in many places 
about the problems caused by people coming to the site with 
preconceived notions and failing to understand that what I present is a 
working model and not a claim of categorical / 'objective' truth or 'fact' 
that people are supposed to take on as a belief system, because, 
especially for all that is non-physical, nobody in all of 'Existence' can 
absolutely, objectively, know the truth of anything!  I hope, too, that you
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will take on board the amusing little homily that I give in the preamble 
of my Night Hells page (i.e., if you haven't already done so)!  :-)  I 
would also draw your attention to the following in case you haven't 
already seen it:
http://www.clarity-of-being.org/my-own-self-
healing.htm#note_for_psychiatric_workers.
Actually I have a friendly if rather distanced, very open-minded view of 
the activities of people like you, because it's very like that figurative 
glass of water, which can be described as half full or half empty.  I can 
see you as yet another 'Bad Boy', no doubt taking a very mangled 
version of my 'message' into the public or at least professional arena.  
Yet on the other hand I can see you as a real Good Guy, for anyone 
bringing in any ideas at all, even if still rather mangled, that challenge 
the horrendous and woeful status quo of the mental 'health' system 
and bring in more liberating notions can be seen as a necessary step 
towards people more widely gaining a more fully 'enlightened' and 
genuinely objective approach that recognises that consciousness 
itself, not any 'external' or 'physical' reality, is the basic nature of what 
we experience, and thus, as far as anyone can tell, of reality itself, so 
that the 'medical' approach to 'mental health' can then be seen to be 
nonsensical and be replaced by a proper evidence / experience based
approach such as what I put forward.
I wish you every success in weakening the whole 'medical' mindset in 
mental healthcare!
Philip.”
To which I responded, hoping to clarify various issues, particularly the 'text' of 
interest, and my intended presentation method:
“Hi Philip,
Thank you for getting back to me so quickly. 
I appreciate your permission - while I'm particularly interested in you 
account because it is available in the public domain, permission 
satisfies the ethics board I am accountable to.
I'm trying to come to the material with as few conceptions as possible, 
and present whole narratives (as far as that's possible within word 
limits) - in this instance I would like to use your 'little brush with 
psychiatry' text . As for objective truths I'm take a relativist position, my
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intention is to examine how the authors influence their own 'realities', 
and to what extent they liberate themselves from the MH system in 
doing so, also more broadly in what this says about that same system.
Thanks for the pointers to further material on the site, I've taken a 
good look around, but I'll revisit those sections.
Best wishes,
James”
To which Philip responded, briefly:
“Good on you, James! I wish you a great time on your project! :-)
Philip.”
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7.5. Appendix 5: Worked Transcript
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7.6. Appendix 6: Analytic Phases
I now offer, by way of an example, a brief summary of the outcome of the analytic
phases as they were applied to Sarah's account. This is necessarily artificial, as it
ignores the overlapping nature of the phases, and the interactions of the analysis 
of this narrative, with the analyses of Philip and Spoon's narratives.
A) Phase 2: Identifying narratives, narrative tone, and rhetorical function
'Master narrative' – Kundalini Awakening (Yogic/Transpersonal Psychology)
Additional narratives – Mid-life crisis (Psychological); Psychotic Episode 
(Psychiatric); Spiritual Development (Christian?)
Emotional tone – Varies: Generally upbeat/educative. Not angry, although 
somewhat defensive (many justifications). Occassionally heroic. Shifts in tone 
attended to in transcript. 
Rhetorical function – Relatively consistent: to describe and define a 
misunderstood spiritual experience; to argue that this fits her 'reality' better than 
the alternative of 'regressive psychosis'. Also: educating; justifying; persuading. 
Responding to an anticipated medical counter-argument, but not wholly anti-
medical.
B) Phase 3: Identities and Identity work
The 'self' that was being brought into being: 
Positioned by self as – Spiritually awakened, more advanced towards a 
universal goal than most others; Educator; Expert-by-experience (Kundalini 
veteran); Expert-by-education (psychiatric nurse); Transformed from previously 
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emotionally broken prior-self  (naïve and empty existence) from materially to 
spiritually 'well-off' (therefore, not 'ill'); Also, a victim of trauma and 'psychotic'.
Transformed self is competent/rational in consensus reality; Symptom free; 
Critical and inquiring mind; A researcher of spiritual wisdom; 'Virgin Mary'; In need
of 'ongoing' spiritual identity-work. In contact with something else, personal proof,
which cannot be shared. Privileged.
Positioned by others as – Largely avoids being positioned by others, or 
describing this, because of tactical silencing; 'a freak at times'; Validated by friend
and counter-community.
C) Phase 4: Thematic priorities and key constructs 
Key constructs and themes being deployed by Sarah (and what work they do):
Kundalini and Higher Self (universalising PLE, privileging PLE, externalising 
PLE; offering direct access to 'truth'; reconstructing 'reality'; producing dichotomy 
between 'enlightened' and 'unenlightened')
Regressive Psychosis (Demonstrating psychiatric understanding; differentiating 
PLE; rejecting patient identity; avoiding contestation with psychiatry)
Mid-life crisis / Unresolved grief (Personalising the experience; Providing 
narrative coherence; transcending and discrediting prior-self)
Communicating PLE (Demonstrating common 'misunderstandings'; 
emphasising importance of being understood; emphasising importance of 
spiritual experiences; demonstrating 'lack of insight' of 'rationalists'.
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D) Phase 5: Destabilizing the narrative 
Re-reading Sarah narrative from a Foucauldian perspective:
 Sarah distancing her experiences from 'regressive psychosis' by 
constructing a productive, rational, competent and relatively docile self. 
 Sarah's Kundalini 'reality' could be described as a 'technology of the self'; 
demanding ongoing self-transformation as part of a journey towards her 
'spiritual' ideal – entailing  'spiritual' identity-work, and the rejection of 
incompatible aspects of the prior-self. Authority over the self, facilitated by 
a bricolage approach to supporting authorities.
 Sarah, in demonstrating various expertises, reverses the psychiatric gaze, 
and locates any 'delusion' within the 'unenlightened' Mental Health system.
This is a 'truth-game' – who determines reality? Closeness of 
knowledge/power revealed.
 Sarah's resistance is quietened, by her selective silence, a necessary 
tactic in the face of a normalising disciplinary power.
 Communication is key though, a spiritual community supports Sarah's 
counter-reading of experience, and their 'truth' comes to shape her 'reality'.
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7.7 Appendix 7: Change of Title
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